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CONFLICT THEORIES OF THE ORIGIN OF THE STATE:¹

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THE question as to the manner by which the state arose is one that has concerned thinkers from earliest times. In spite or because of the long duration of the problem and of the many and varied attempts throughout all the ages to solve it, there is no unanimity of agreement now, nor has there ever been, upon either the distinctive characteristics of that institution we term the state; or second, the cause and process of its development.

CERTAIN answers have been given with relative frequency, however, and one of the most frequent we shall now consider. All the way from Polybius to our contemporary, Franz Oppenheimer, there have been scholars who have deemed conditions resulting from conflict between simple groups as the primary element in the origin of the state. The adherents of this theory may be classified as members of the "conflict school."

THIS group of theorists has set up, either explicitly or by implication, three requisites which must be fulfilled before a human society can be considered a state:

(1) SOCIAL stratification must take place as a consequence of the fact that a superior² minority has gained and organised control over a large majority of the people.

(2) THE economic system of private ownership of property must be established among both the superordinate and subordinate groups; hence the former must have obtained coercive power to enforce its decrees over the latter. The subordinate group must be continually seeking to become dominant itself.

(3) BOTH the master and the subject groups must be settled in a definite territorial area, an area over which the ruling class or "the state" exercises sovereignty.

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² "Superior" denotes superordination only and not biological or moral superiority.

It is plain that the state as conceived by the "conflict school" is a class state; it is an institution with two broad social divisions of widely divergent rank and power, one possessing and the other seeking to obtain control of the coercive elements which came into existence at the very time of the establishment of the state. In the words of Oppenheimer: "Every state in history was or is a state of classes, a polity of superior and inferior social groups based upon distinctions either of rank or of property."

THIS viewpoint of the nature of the state is not peculiar to the "conflict school"; its especial stamp is derived from its conception of the process by which this type of state is believed to have come into being. The contention of the school is that stratification and its political consequent, the state, originated through the conquest of one unstratified group by another, the conquering group imposing itself upon the conquered as a privileged, exploiting, social class. Thus the state is the political product which issued from circumstances directly due to the conquest of one primitive tribe by another. And it is this very conquest which, it is claimed, precipitated out those three distinctive elements—establishment of superior and inferior classes, rule of the superior class, and sovereignty over a specific area—that set the state apart from the social order immediately preceding it.

HERE an important distinction must be made; it is not conflict in and of itself that has given rise to the state; rather its source is to be found in the *conquest* of one group by another, after conflict has occurred between them. To sum up the fundamental position of the "conflict school" in regard to the nature and origin of the state: the state is a class state; it has originated through conflict indirectly and conquest directly.

THUS the processes of conflict and conquest, the second growing out of the first, led to the rise of the state, but these processes took place among primitive, unstratified groups, and the "conflict school" considers these groups to have had certain definite characteristics. They are similar in essence to the community with mechanical solidarity of Durkheim and the *Gemeinschaft* of Tönnies. The bond of union among members of such a social unit is kinship and not territorial contiguity. Further, social stratification has not set in to destroy the homogeneity of these "sacred communities"; the persons who make them up are mentally, morally, and socially similar. The force which controls the life of the community is the force of tradition; the "cake of custom" has fixed itself almost unshakably upon the group. As a result of this close-knit condition the person is almost completely absorbed in the group. He has no notion of "personal liberty," and is entirely dominated by tradition. So binding are the

social decrees of the community, so deeply are they ingrained into each and every member, that, although the elders may occupy positions of control, overt coercion to enforce the prevailing code is rare. The members, moreover, are very group-conscious; they enter into almost no relations with outsiders, whom they almost invariably deem inferior to themselves. Such, then, is the nature of the groups whose struggles and conquests have resulted in the origin of the state, according to the viewpoint of the "conflict school."

WITH this fundamental position of the "conflict school" as just outlined in mind, let us now turn to a somewhat more detailed survey of the theories that have been advanced, by some of its more important members. The fact that conflict was an element to be considered in the establishment of the state was probably recognised by Herodotus, and certainly Polybius merits a place in the annals of the "conflict school"; but the first thinker to present a well rounded outline of the manner by which the state arose from intergroup struggle was the remarkable Moslem geographer, historian, and sociologist of the fourteenth century, Ibn Khaldūn. In his great work, the *PROLEGOMENA TO HISTORY*, he states: "History has for a true object making us understand the spirit of the tribe, the different kinds of superiority which groups obtain over one another and which lead to the birth of empires and dynasties, to distinction of classes" Gumpłowicz in his *SOCIOLOGISCHE ESSAYS*, published in 1899, revealed his familiarity with the writings of the great Moslem by a chapter entitled "An Arabian Sociologist of the Fourteenth Century." The present-day champion of the conflict theory, Oppenheimer, has only praise for Ibn Khaldūn.

It is in the *PROLEGOMENA* that the material which places the learned Berber of Tunis among the conflict theorists is to be found. In that work the point is made that people who live from the produce furnished by their herds are usually addicted to nomadic life, while agriculturalists tend to congregate in towns and villages. Under settled conditions, however, vice, luxury, and immorality abound, with the inevitable consequence that the moral fibre of the inhabitants decays. Living behind gates and walls in perfect security, with troops posted on the outskirts of the community, the population as a whole renounces the bearing of arms and soon loses its pristine bravery, ferocity, and pride in independence. Moreover, each sedentary sybarite pursues his own individual interest without regard to the welfare of his neighbours; group solidarity is superseded by extreme individuation. Among the nomads, on the other hand, the hard, rigorous life of the desert engenders simplicity of manners, and physical ruggedness and endurance. The constant moving about and the ceaseless raiding and counter-raiding of desert tribes develops a

strong group discipline and intense *esprit de corps*; the commands of leaders are instantly obeyed, and each combatant has but one thought, the protection of tribe and family. Further, all the members of the unit are bound together by kinship ties. Thus nomads in the desert are characterized by abstemiousness, discipline, united actions, fighting ability, bravery, and ferocity. Hence Ibn Khaldūn draws the generalisation that any pastoral nomad group can always vanquish a sedentary community of equal man-power.

THIS leads to a continual conquest of towns and cities by the brave and hardy desert dwellers, who, attracted by the ease and luxury and bountifulness of city life, abandon their sparse grass-lands to sweep down upon the settled agricultural districts. This overcoming of tillage peoples means the establishment of a state or empire. The nomads, upon becoming sedentary, soon lose their distinctive characteristics. They drift toward all the customs of sedentary life and promptly form sedentary habits. Becoming habituated to abundance and well-being and softness, they gradually lose their courage and ferocity. Contact with the alien inhabitants of the city, leading to a mixture of institutions and of blood, enfeebles family relationships and domestic ties. Finally, the deep-rooted *esprit de corps* is entirely obliterated. Having taken on civilized manners, the wild tribal group loses much of its pristine valour and strength, and, in its turn, falls an easy prey to some nomadic tribe fresh from the desert. In this way the empires established by nomads undergo a constant cycle, a rise to power and then a collapse.

THIS very brief summary of Ibn Khaldūn's theory relating to the origin of states or empires is incomplete, yet it is perhaps sufficient to show that he properly belongs to the "conflict school."

CERTAIN it is that in the nomadic tribes observed by him neither class stratification nor private property had set in, while bonds of blood kinship tied together all the members of the group, marked as it was by rigid social control and an intense tribal spirit. Hence all the aspects of organic solidarity attach themselves to these and similar nomad groups. It is also true that among sedentary urban or semi-urban peoples the original homogeneity of culture and fixed social control gives way to disunion and individuation.

IT must be admitted, however, that Ibn Khaldūn ascribed the origin of states to the conquest of *stratified* tillage communities by nomadic tribes. From this it follows that he does not regard the state as the product of two similar, unstratified groups, and thus Ibn Khaldūn is somewhat at variance with other conflict theorists in this respect.

NEVERTHELESS, the crucial point that states arise through group conflict and conquest is adhered to strictly. Further, in these "conquest" states

or empires class differentiation definitely takes place ; the conquering nomads become rulers and masters over the subject peoples within the limits of the conquered domain. The great Moslem's conception of the rise and fall of empires, and of the reasons for the cyclical recurrence of this rise and fall, make still more plain his position as a conflict theorist and in addition reveal him as a thinker who emphasized causal principles in history at a time when eschatological viewpoints everywhere held sway.

LET us now turn to the great forerunner of Montesquieu, Jean Bodin, one of the most striking figures of the sixteenth century. There is no little divergence of opinion as to whether Ibn Khaldūn influenced or even was known to Jean Bodin. In his *PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY* Flint makes the statement, which incidentally casts light upon the importance of Bodin, that "Ibn Khaldūn excepted, with whose work he was unacquainted, Bodin added much more to what his predecessors had done than Montesquieu to what he had accomplished." Lichtenberger, in his *DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL THEORY*, does not see fit to mention Ibn Khaldūn either in the chapter on Bodin or elsewhere. Yet it is known that the mother of the French scholar was a Spanish Jewess from one of those families that translated and otherwise facilitated the spread of Moslem writings. It is hardly likely that Jean Bodin, educated as he was and with such a background, could have been totally ignorant of Ibn Khaldūn, a writer exerting great influence in Mohammedan circles. But whatever connection may have existed between the two thinkers, there is no doubt that both believed that the state was founded by conquest.

In his philosophy of society, Jean Bodin indicated three types of social organisation : the family, the civil society, and the state. He agrees with Aristotle, that all society has a natural origin in the family : "The beginnings of all civil societies are derived from a family which is itself a natural society, and by the father of nature itself first founded in the beginning together with mankind." While the family is a natural society, and existed before the civil society, still the former contains the germ of the latter. This arises from the fact that civil society arose because reason, ingrafted by God in man, made him desirous of society and speech with other men as well as causing him to take pleasure in the propagation and increase of families.

WHILE civil society has its origin in the social nature of man, the state originates quite differently : "force, violence, ambition, covetousness, and desire of revenge have armed one (civil society) against another ; the issues of war and combat giving victory unto the one side made the other to become unto them slaves. Then that full and entire liberty of nature given to every man, to live as himself best please, was altogether taken from the vanquished. So the words of Lord

and Master, Prince and Subject, before unknown unto the world, were first brought into use. Yea, Reason and the very light of nature leadeth us to believe very force and violence to have given course and beginning unto Commonweale." Thus Bodin presents the idea of a free and equal civil society antecedent to politically organised society, and anticipates Gumpłowicz in his concept of struggle as responsible for the origin of the state.

It cannot be said that the social philosophies of Ibn Khaldūn and Jean Bodin are similar; their details are considerably at variance, but the basic principles underlying both have much in common. There is at least some suggestion of similarity between the nomad tribe and the civil society. Both are groups without social stratification and in each the individual members are practically on equal footing. According to Bodin, after a period of violence and war among just such groups the chances of combat lead to conquest and the establishment of the state, in which the conquerors rule and the vanquished are enslaved. In contrast with this, Ibn Khaldūn does not indicate that the tillage peoples, subjugated by the desert tribes, are forced into a condition of slavery. But whether or not the conquered population is placed in servitude, there is no question that the states of Ibn Khaldūn and Jean Bodin are class states founded by conquest.

THE remarkable advances made by Charles Darwin in the field of biology during the 19th century called forth many theories applying the idea of "struggle for existence" to explain the existing form or the development of human society. Thus the theories of Walter Bagehot and Karl Marx make use of the concept of conflict arising from the struggle for existence as a causal factor in the social process; yet these thinkers and many others like them are not "conflict theorists" in the narrow sense of the term. They either do not concern themselves with the origin of the state or do not consider it as an institution which in origin and form is primarily due to the conquest of one community by another. Although the *PHYSICS AND POLITICS* of Bagehot traces the forces (of which one is intergroup conflict) that have shaped communities weighted down by the "cake of custom," and although "nation building" receives some attention, the general viewpoint is not entirely in accord with that of the "conflict school."

LESTER F. WARD may also be reckoned among the conflict theorists. In presenting that part of Ward's system which has to do primarily with the state and its origin, it may be well to begin with his concept of structure: "A structure implies a certain orderly arrangement and harmonious adjustment of the materials, an adaptation of the parts and their subordination to the whole." Every type of structure—inorganic, organic, or social,—is held to come about through the action of a single principle; they are all products of the interaction of

antagonistic forces. Through the workings of this universal law structures do not remain static; they pass from a primordial stage of great simplicity into a more complex secondary stage. These are called *protosocial* and *metasocial* respectively.

UNLIKE Ibn Khaldūn, who does not tell us how his nomad tribes first came into being, Ward says that the origin of his conflict groups is the simple propagating couple. Very soon there is a small family consisting of parents and children of both sexes; these grow to maturity, pair off, and thereby produce families of the second order. After several generations the group has attained a size sufficient for it to be termed a horde or "clan." At length the clan becomes overgrown and splits up into several lesser units which separate more or less territorially, but live in comparative peace with each other. Because of continuous reproduction the clans multiply rapidly, so that there results a wider and wider spatial separation, until finally certain clans have become so far removed from the original center of dispersion as to lose all connection with it. In this way Ward pictures a great area of the earth's surface sparsely populated by a multitude of clans which have spread out along territorial lines of least resistance, with each clan in contact only with the few closest to it.

THERE now comes into play the process of social differentiation, a process which after a sufficient length of time has elapsed makes in all essential respects different races of clans that once dispersed from a single source. Local variations, naturally undergone by the groups in the course of their migrations, have slowly but surely changed the common speech of all into a series of different languages. Likewise local variations have rendered increasingly dissimilar their customs and beliefs. The clans are now structures of the *protosocial* stage; altogether similar elements compose each group; and the fact that they have all developed from a single source has resulted in a repetition of like groups without any evolution in form or structural advance, although differentiations, *e.g.*, in speech, customs, and beliefs, have taken place. We may say, then, that the *protosocial* stage is marked by a large number of isolated communities.

SOCIAL differentiation is succeeded by social integration as a result of the "interaction of antagonistic forces." Social evolution has reached the stage in which innumerable alien hordes each occupy a certain territorial area and each has members motivated by inherent gustatory and sexual appetites to perform the functions essential to life, nutrition and reproduction. Inevitably mutual encroachment produces hostility among groups; war results, and one clan proves superior and conquers its foe or foes. The *metasocial* stage commences with the union of one or more simple hordes into an amalgamated group. The first step in the whole process is brought about by conquest.

THE initial effect of this subjugation is the establishment of a system of caste, the conquering race assuming the role of a superior or noble caste and the vanquished race being relegated to the position of an inferior or ignoble caste. The greater part of the conquered race is enslaved and compelled to work ; thus begins labour in the economic sense. The conquerors parcel out the lands to the leading military chieftains ; thus the institution of private ownership of land has its origin. Mutual race hatreds cause perpetual uprisings by the vanquished race requiring constant suppression by the military power. This is costly, dangerous, and precarious, and wisdom soon dictates a form of systematic treatment for offenders. Personal regulation gradually gives way to general rules, and these ultimately take the form of laws. Government by law gradually succeeds arbitrary military commands.

THE effect of the rise of castes, of private property, and of laws is nothing less than the origin of the state. In the words of Ward : " The state is a spontaneous genetic product, resulting like all other structures from the interaction of antagonistic forces, checking and restraining one another and evolving a great social structure. . . . " The state having been founded, the forces which carry on the process of social integration continue their action and bring forth the nation. First, the great majority of both subject and master groups are engaged in a struggle for subsistence. In the intense economic activity fostered by the new order, with its law, private property, and division of labour, this sameness of essential interest causes commingling and co-operation among the two races with a consequent decline of hatred and prejudice. Second, however great the antipathy between the two groups may be, still it is not sufficient to prevent intermarriage. Miscegenation therefore begins immediately and steadily becomes greater with the passage of time. The final outcome of the action of these forces is the production of a people. There then comes a realisation by all the population that they are " one people " and coincidentally an attachment for country and land arises—thus a nation comes into being.

It should be remembered that this type of nation, the development of which has just been traced from the very beginning of society, is not at all a modern nation, but one that probably existed in prehistoric times. Struggle between two states of this type brings with it conquest and amalgamation, and a state slightly higher in the scale of social structures arises. With each step upward greater social efficiency is acquired. This process of conquest and amalgamation and slow progress has been repeated again and again in the case of every nation of which history tells us. Thus Ward adheres to his " conflict theory " position to the end. To conflict between unstratified clans is due the origin of the state ; to conflict between states is due the march forward to

greater social efficiency and higher civilization. It might be indicated in passing that Ward, in contrast with Gumpłowicz, holds to the monogenetic theory of the origin of races and attributes the rise of different races to their inheritance of qualities caused by local variations. This theory is of course open to grave objection in the light of modern biological knowledge.

IN spite of Ward's emphasis on conflict, it should not be forgotten that he believed that the process of social evolution could be modified by the "natural force of the human intellect." In fact, so much did Ward deal with the psychic factor in human society that Ellwood regards him as a founder of psychological sociology.

PROBABLY more than any other member of the "conflict school," the Austrian sociologist, Ludwig Gumpłowicz, gave currency to its form of thought. He contended that the struggles of races offered the only scientific explanation of the phenomena of human history. The key to his sociology is supplied by the word conflict. Barnes has this to say of Gumpłowicz: "His thorough analysis of the social process, viewed as the interaction of conflicting groups, is one of the most fundamental notions which has yet been brought forward by sociology. . . . His whole sociology is based on premises of ethnic diversity, group and class conflict, and the political sovereignty of a ruling minority." Gumpłowicz sets up group conflict for mastery in all its forms as the motive power of history, adequate to explain every phase of political action and theory.

IN applying this hypothesis to the origin of the state, two assumptions are made: an inherent, deadly hatred among different groups, peoples, and races; and the polygenetic origin of mankind. Gumpłowicz maintains that the sociologist cannot discover the ultimate origin of society but must assume the existence of social groups to start the social process. The prehistoric period was characterized by the birth and differentiation of heterogeneous social units. This polygenetic viewpoint is supported by two types of evidence: (1) good authorities and (2) the observation that history shows a steady decrease in the number of stocks and a constant amalgamation of tribes into larger structures. The source of the unity among the members of these earliest social groups is primarily consanguinity, although identity of economic interests also plays a large part. It is these social groups—according to Gumpłowicz—that enter as single elements into the struggle for domination, an eternal process that can never have an end.

THE fundamental motive of group conflict throughout history has been the desire for an improvement in economic well-being. In the earliest form of intergroup struggle the conquered were exterminated, but in the course of time this general massacre was altered

to the milder modes of slavery and economic exploitation. In this process of the super-position of one social group upon another and the subjection and exploitation of the weaker is to be found the origin of sovereignty and the state. The first states thus had two castes, one of rulers and the other of slaves. Gumpłowicz assigns superior group unity and discipline as the reasons for the ability of the conquerors to defeat and exploit the vanquished.

To step aside from the exposition of theory for an instant, it will be noted how much more positive Gumpłowicz is than Ward; the latter attributes the rise of group conflict to encroachments rather than to inherent hatreds, gives the fluctuating chances of combat as the cause for victory on one side or the other, and makes the separation between the master and subject elements much less distinct.

BUT to resume the exposition of the Gumpłowicz theory: as soon as the first political relations were established, the process of social conflict is transformed from external strife among groups into a struggle between classes within the state. The bringing about of adjustment between sovereign and subject classes is complicated by the rise of secondary classes of priests and professional men (to choose two frequent examples). This rise is due to the needs of the developing state. The necessity for securing loyalty and unity to withstand outside foes forces the ruling class to grant certain concessions, and thus comes into existence the concept of "rights." From this idea of legal rights there comes forth a system of law. The class in power soon realizes that it can most easily hold and expand its sway by the establishment of political and legal institutions, backed by coercion, so that to gain control of these becomes the object of formation of state policy and the advancement of the interests of the ruling classes. Hence we can see that political rights are the legal statement of the actual conditions that exist in any political society at a given time.

PARALLEL with these developments there goes on a process of social unification. The two groups ultimately come to use the same language, have the same customs and religion, and intermarry. In this way the nation, the highest product of political and social evolution, arises. The highly developed state, however, is never the product of a single conquest, but is the compound result of many conquests and partial or complete assimilations or amalgamations. The natural tendency is for a state to increase until its strength is broken by external resistance or internal disruption.

THIS last part of Gumpłowicz's theory is exactly similar to Ward's. There is a further point of similarity that does not appear in the earlier writings of Gumpłowicz: late in life he was compelled to admit that behind polygenism lay the process of differentiation through which

the human race of common heredity and single birth-place was broken up into "innumerable homogeneous hordes. . . ." and this is the position of Ward.

THE great contemporary of Gumplowicz, Ratzenhofer, believed in the origin of the state through conflict of blood-relationship groups, but there is a deep-seated contrast between the theories of the two men. Gumplowicz not only considered the individual entirely as a group product but also made the group the starting point of the social process. On the other hand, the individual is the focus of Ratzenhofer's sociological investigations; the social process is a process of individual phenomena. The concern of Gumplowicz is the group as a whole; the concern of Ratzenhofer is the single unit, which, with other units, makes up the group.

RATZENHOFER, like his predecessors, set up a universal principle to explain all sociological phenomena and for him "it is the key of *interests* that unlocks the door of every treasure house of sociological lore." Every individual is endowed with certain inner forces of vital and psychic character which are termed "interests." The whole social process is the incessant reaction of persons urged on by interests that in part conflict, and in part coincide, with the interests of their fellows. Hence the relations among various individuals are of two types: those caused by conjunction of interests and those caused by conflict of interests. Ratzenhofer places the innate interests in the following categories: the sexual interest, which is the basis of family and race and insures continuance of the species; the physiological interest, which deals with the food quest; the individual interest, which drives the human being to fulfil his personal instincts regardless of all else; the social interest, originally due to relations of consanguinity which causes subordination of selfish desires to group welfare; and the transcendental interest, which looks to the ultimate and unseen where struggle between individual and collective interests has ceased. On this basis Ratzenhofer states: "The social process is a continual formation of groups around interests and a continual exertion of reciprocal influences by means of group action."

REVERSING the assumption of Gumplowicz, the monogenetic origin of the human race is assumed by Ratzenhofer. The first groups arise because of community of origin of certain individuals, and this blood-bond silences for a time the interests of the individual, which would otherwise render him absolutely hostile to all other men. Through increase in numbers and quest for food these primitive clans are forced into spatial separation, and this gradually leads to race-differentiation. The fulfilment of such interests as are dominant in the savage tribe produces a certain structural and functional arrangement, and thus the rudiments of social authority arise.

AND now the social process goes on among these early structures, marked by consanguinity, by a willingness of the individual to merge his interests with those of the entire tribe, and by a certain group authority. The group, manifesting as it does the dominant dispositions of its members (to control food sources and reproduce without limit), inevitably clashes with other groups which, like itself, are moved by the same interests. The struggle for existence has broken out in intergroup hostility and warfare, an identical state of strife being checked in the individuals of the inimical groups by the restraints of blood-kinship. From this stage on, Ratzenhofer is like all the other "conflict theorists." Struggle among these primitive tribes results in victor and vanquished. At first the defeated are killed; later they are enslaved. Thus the state comes into being, with its classes (hostile to each other), laws and sovereignty. Conflict correspondingly falls into two divisions: class struggle for control of internal politics, and the efforts of the community to extend its possessions and to secure them from foreign attacks.

As a consequence of the processes just described, an extensive differentiation of social structures begins. The social process goes on as a continuous rhythm of the individualization of structures arising anew out of others already in existence, and of the socialization of structures already existing. Coincidentally the form of state gradually evolves. After conflict has established the state, there follows a period when peaceful interests predominate; this results in an attempt to reconcile a limited creative freedom of individuals with control over the subjugated. As this effort succeeds the "culture state" supersedes the "conflict state." The ultimate dominance of the culture state means the complete socialization of man and political, social, and industrial equality through perfection of the social organisation.

SOROKIN, in his *CONTEMPORARY SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES*, states that Ratzenhofer is only in part an adherent of the "conflict school." No justification is given for this viewpoint; some evidence is badly needed, for Ratzenhofer asserts that the origin of the state and of social stratification, with their accompanying institutions, was due to intergroup conflict and conquest arising therefrom. His theory of interests as the mainspring of the social process supplies an explanation of the cause of the hostility and warfare among primitive tribes, a point concerning which Ward and Gumpłowicz say very little.³

HERETOFORE nothing but straightforward exposition of the theories that distinguish the school have been given; it is now necessary to

³The Conflict Theory of Franz Oppenheimer is next in chronological sequence, but as Oppenheimer will expound his own theory in a forthcoming issue of the *SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW*, this is omitted.—[Ed.]

discuss briefly instances of favourable and adverse criticism. Further, historical evidence bearing on the conflict theory should at least be mentioned.

THE opponents of the "conflict theory" do not contend that it is utterly untenable; they are usually willing to accept it as *one* thesis among many, but they reject it as *the* single explanation for the genesis of every—or, let us say, almost every—state in history. The present writers have not included in the present exposition of the conflict theory qualifications that account for the genesis of nations like the United States and other obvious exceptions to the general thesis. An examination of the literature of the past decade, however, will soon convince anyone that Barnes goes too far when he writes of Gumplowicz: "His explanation probably goes further toward clearing up the problem of political origin than any other theory; and it has gained such general acceptance among sociologists that it may be designated as *the* sociological theory of the origin of the state." Moreover, the consensus of present-day opinion would hold these sentences of Ward to be over-optimistic: "Gumplowicz and Ratzenhofer have abundantly and admirably proved that the genesis of society as we know it has been through the struggle of races. We at last have a true key to the solution of the origin of society. It is the only scientific explanation that has been offered of the facts and phenomena of human history."

IN tracing the development of the state most stress has been laid upon the manner in which that institution first came into existence; it is to be remembered, in considering historical support for the "conflict theory," that the school does not contend that the complex states of antiquity and of to-day are the outcome of a single conquest. On the contrary, such states are deemed the product of countless conquests that have occurred successively among earlier states, each later nation being more complex than those immediately before it on the time scale. Oppenheimer gives a list of states that have originated through conquest: "Everywhere we find some warlike tribe of wild men breaking through the boundaries of some less warlike people, settling down as nobility and founding its State. In Mesopotamia, wave follows wave, state follows state—Babylonians, Amoritans, Assyrians, Arabs, Medes, Persians, Macedonians, Parthians, Mongols, Seljuks, Tartars, Turks; on the Nile, Hyksos, Nubians, Persians, Greeks, Romans, Arabs, Turks; in Greece, the Doric States are typical examples; in Italy, Romans, Ostrogoths, Lombards, Franks, Germans; in Spain, Carthaginians, Visigoths, Arabs; in Gaul, Romans, Franks, Burgundians, Normans; in Britain, Saxons, Normans. In India wave upon wave of wild warlike clans has flooded over the country even to the islands of the Indian Ocean.

So also is it with China." To this list might be added the Frankish states in Syria (established during the Crusades) and the Hungarian state. The countries named above do not by any means constitute all the nations founded by conquest, yet the number is sufficient to make clear that the "conflict theory" has ample historical justification for at least some of its hypotheses.

If the three requisites—class stratification, coercive enforcement of upper-class control, and delimited territorial area—that distinguish the state as such according to the "conflict school" be accepted, then the validity of the theory depends upon whether or not these three characteristics could have come into being without conflict and conquest. There are, of course, other points in the "conflict" viewpoint which can be and have been attacked, without serious threat to the entire theory. In his section on Gumpłowicz, Sorokin, author of *CONTEMPORARY SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES*, has a criticism which he applies to the whole school. Sorokin holds that consolidations of groups have been achieved without warfare and that different ethnic groups are not necessarily hostile. These objections do not seem vital: first, because the state is something quite different from mere consolidation; and second, because the lack of "absolute" hostility does not preclude conflict, conquest, and the rise of the state. Sorokin also writes that social stratification is a close correlate of any human society; he states: "We do not know any single example where, in a group of men more or less permanently living together, and having no war, social stratification did not exist." He also claims that the ruling upper classes have not always been composed of the victorious conquerors. Further, he denies that laws, judicial institutions, and customs have originated through conquest, although he grants a facilitating role to the factor of warfare. The argument that social stratification and laws have developed without conflict and conquest constitutes a serious criticism of the conflict theory if it can be supported, but the cases and authorities cited by Sorokin are not altogether convincing. It seems that further evidence must be adduced.

THE ORIGIN OF THE STATE, by W. C. MacLeod, takes a position diametrically opposed to the "conflict theory," but is based on data from aboriginal North America only. Now Oppenheimer explicitly recognises that conditions in North America require a modification of his theory. In the New World, where no herdsmen existed, hunting tribes conquered the agriculturalists, and in those areas in which roving huntsmen only were to be found, these peoples were eliminated but not subjugated by their conquerors, who imported men to be exploited from afar. In those European colonies in which importation of slaves was forbidden, the growth of the state is explained by the fact that the men to be exploited imported themselves from other countries

where their position was unbearable—there was an “infection” with “statehood” from abroad. Despite these modifications by Oppenheimer, MacLeod holds that the “conflict theory” is untenable for North America because: (1) there is no evidence that an unstratified social group ever conquered another like group and superimposed itself as a ruling class; (2) many communities evolved social stratification through internal processes; (3) the “infection with statehood” from “conflict state” source is pure speculation. MacLeod further contends that primitive tribes have definite boundaries, speaks of the “myth of absolute hostility” of early groups, and asserts that the ideology of inferior classes, expropriation of lands, laws, and tribute must have existed in the conquering group before such institutions were imposed on defeated groups. This last point is apparently met by Oppenheimer, for he describes the process by which herdsmen develop the institutional prerequisites for statehood.

IN spite of the criticisms noted, however, it seems safe to subscribe to the opinion voiced by Lowie in his *ORIGIN OF THE STATE*, which is in effect that while the position of the “conflict theory” is far from unassailable, still it is of great value in accounting for the genesis of many if not all states, rests on concrete evidence, and explains much otherwise not readily intelligible.

MEMORANDA PREPARED FOR THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: by Alice Raven.

A. MEMORANDUM ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE MURDERER AS IT RELATES TO THE QUESTION OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT.

(1) THE researches which I have made into the psychology of murder tend to show that the murderer is always a man of pathologically introverted temperament. (N.B.—I take the male murderer as typical because his case is rather easier to verify than that of the woman.) This would imply that by his mental constitution he is extremely susceptible to intrusion of sub-conscious forces. Corresponding to this peculiar mentality is the characteristic that he is poorly adjusted to the external world and its social requirements, towards which his feeling is alternately fear and hatred. Moreover, on occasions such a man is so completely dominated by inner forces that the external world becomes for him merely part of the machinery of his own mental situation. At such times his acts and language become symbolical, because all the facts of his environment stand to his mind only as representations of the inner drama which dominates his consciousness. It is this reversal of the normal attitude which makes the statements and language of murderers (as well as other persons of a pathologically introverted temperament) seem so inexplicable, since they are in reality talking out of a part of their mind other than that which perceives the facts of the outer world in a normal logical sequence.

(2) SUCH a man has naturally a sense of power owing to his perception of unknown forces within himself, but he has no means of working out this sense of power on the plane of reality because of his defective social adjustment. He compensates for his deficiency, therefore, by a phantasy in which the self-assertive qualities denied expression in his outer life find satisfaction in a dream of omnipotence enjoyed at the expense of all other human beings who stand in his way. In this dream he is God, king or father (interchangeable terms in this connection) with full power over human life and responsible to no one for his deeds. Before he becomes an actual murderer, however, another phenomenon must have occurred in his mental life, namely, that he has become unable to distinguish between his phantasy and the facts of reality. Such a state of mind is insanity from the psychological point of view (a definition which will not be found at variance either with the neurological or the legal view of the question). The psychological thesis is that only the insane man, to whom his phantasy is the actual reality, would take human life: (1) because, man being a social being who needs the stimulus of his fellows and their co-operation in order to achieve success, only the man who believed in his own omnipotence would feel himself able to dispense with the help of others and to cut himself off completely from social relationships by an act

of murder; (2) because in view of man's social constitution and inborn sense of social responsibility only the man dominated by a phantasy of irresponsible power could feel justified in robbing another person of the inalienable right of life.

(3) EVERY insane person with a phantasy of power does not, however, commit a murder; there is therefore evidently still another factor conditioning the character of the murderer. More research is needed on this point, but I am inclined to think that the murderer is a man who has a memory of cruelty in childhood to work off. Having been himself once at the mercy of someone (probably a parent) who seemed to have absolute power over him, he seeks, when the time comes, to exercise that same power over someone weaker than (or momentarily at a disadvantage to) himself, namely, the person who interferes with his phantasy of omnipotence, or through whose death he can triumphantly assert that phantasy.

(4) THE murderer does not commit a murder haphazard, but every murder corresponds to a definite psychological situation. Again, more research work is needed here, but one or two types of murder can be definitely established. (a) It is a well-known psychological fact that the man who indulges in phantasy and shirks reality tends to love his mother but to hate his father, the two parents standing, in the typical situation, for phantasy and reality respectively. The sentiment of hatred towards the father is carried over by the murderer to anyone who later represents his father to him, either as the embodiment of law and authority or as having the status of his father in power and wealth, which he himself covets and thinks he ought to enjoy. Should such a representative person (as, for instance in the first case, a policeman) seek to thwart him or to interfere with his "right" of possession, his hatred may at any time blossom out into an act of murder against that person. (b) A person with a phantasy of power may fall in love with a woman, but may find an insuperable obstacle to his desires in the person of a rival or in the shape of circumstances with which he is not man enough to cope. He therefore takes the short cut of murdering her in order to achieve his purpose; by the act of murdering his hatred on his rival and the community and at the same time ensuring that the object of his attachment shall be safe for him in "the other world," where he often follows her by an act of suicide. It must be noted that to the pathological introvert there is but a slight barrier between "this world" and "the next"; the "other world" is merely the embodiment of the world of his phantasy.

THE foregoing considerations, I would suggest, have an important bearing on the abolition of capital punishment in two respects.

(I.) IF murder is only committed by persons of definitely abnormal mental constitution and under circumstances of definite psychological

import, there is no such possibility as the committal of (a) a chance murder; (b) murder by a person of normal propensities; (c) murder merely for the sake of monetary gain. There is no fear, therefore, that the abolition of capital punishment would seriously, if at all, augment the number of murders, for there can only at any time be a small number of persons pathologically inclined to murder and determined to a particular murder by a certain set of circumstances. Moreover, the study of murder cases suggests that potential murderers are not deterred from their crime by the fear of death. Many murderers commit suicide (the Blue Book for 1927 shows that 41 murderers committed suicide in 1927, the number of murders being 99), thus anticipating the sentence; others give themselves up in order to be hanged, so that it seems that in the murderer's mind his own death is envisaged as part of the solution of a problem which he is seeking to find in murdering another.

(II.) If murder is a phenomenon of abnormal mentality, there is no reason why therapeutic measures should not be applied to the murderer as well as to any other insane person. The abolition of capital punishment would necessarily be more socially satisfactory if, with a clear conception of the mind of the murderer and of the motives which led to his crime, we could work out a rational system of therapy which might be applied during the necessary term of confinement.

B. MEMORANDUM ON THE APPLICATION OF PSYCHOLOGY TO CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE POSSIBILITY OF INJUSTICE IN CRIMINAL TRIALS.

(1) THE study of psychology shows that a court of criminal justice not only stands as a court of legal procedure in the minds of the persons present in the court, but also presents to their minds a peculiar emotional atmosphere as the place of trial of a human being charged with an offence of which the inner meaning is that he has followed his own individual personal interest against the claims of social responsibility. Moreover, the crime which the prisoner has (or has not) committed is not a crime to which he alone of all human beings has been tempted, for every human being suffers at times from a temptation to forego his social responsibilities and to follow his personal comfort, ease and advantage. Thus in this sense every person in the court is himself "a case" and all the apparatus of a court of justice (of which the dominant figures are the judge, the counsel for the prosecution and the counsel for the defence) are for the time being the externalisation of factors in the individual's own inner drama. Unknown to himself, therefore, these figures have a very strong suggestive force over his mind. The judge, in particular, stands in his mind as a fear-compelling image, being the one who pronounces sentence on the man who has preferred his personal

advantage or aggrandisement (psychologically, phantasy) to the claims of the social environment (psychologically, reality). The figure of the prosecuting counsel has a scarcely less potent suggestive force, since it is his office to prove that the prisoner actually has been guilty of the offence charged against him. The counsel for the defence, having the milder office of trying to prove that the prisoner is innocent, has not the same suggestive power of fear over the minds of those who listen to him. But since these, always with their own "case" in mind beneath the surface of consciousness, would like to believe that his view is correct, he may, with a sufficiently forceful personality, wield a suggestive power over their minds not less strong than that of the counsel for the prosecution.

(2) THE fact of this emotional suggestive force operating in a court of justice is of especial importance as it affects the minds of the jury, since it is their office to bring in a verdict on the evidence presented to them, whilst unknown to themselves there is a subjective factor influencing their minds in all their estimation of objective facts. Each juror, for the psychological reasons mentioned above, will tend to see in the person of the counsel for the prosecution an image of his own father (who was the accuser in his youth when he tried to evade the claims of reality or social responsibility). The more such a juror feared his own father, the more menacing will the figure of the counsel be to him and the more difficult will it become for him to free himself sufficiently from the suggestive power of his personality and of his presentment of the case to weigh the evidence without prejudice. This counsel's dominating influence over the minds of the jury will only be counteracted if it is possible for the counsel for the defence, without the help of the suggestive power of fear, by the force of his own authority and personality, to compel the attention of the jury to an open-minded consideration of his presentation of the case. Finally, when the jury listen to the summing up of the judge, they come directly under the mental influence of the most authoritative "father-figure" in the court. On occasions, when the suggestive power which the judge wields by virtue of his office is reinforced by a strong personality, this mental influence working at such a solemn moment tends to induce in the jury a state of hypnotic fear. With such a predisposition in the jury to adopt the mental attitude of the judge, caused by their psychological relation to him, it is obvious that in arriving at their verdict they cannot always weigh the opposing evidence with that strict impartiality which would make justice automatic in criminal legal proceedings.

(3) THE psychological meaning of a court of criminal justice operates as a subjective factor in the mind of judge and counsel as well as in the minds of the jury. The judge, as judge, tends to identify himself

with the "father-figure" before whom the prisoner is arraigned as a psychological criminal. Just as far as the latter, apart from the actual crime of *e.g.* murder with which he is charged, has committed the psychological "crime" of shirking reality in order to enjoy a phantasy of power, so far will he "hate" the "father-figure," and the judge will feel himself to be the object of this hatred directed against him as the dominant father-representative in the court. Unconsciously, therefore, unless he can thoroughly discount this subjective factor in himself, he will be prejudiced against any prisoner who stands before him revealed by character and record to be actuated by motives of hostility towards himself (that is, what he stands for, as representative of the community in its critical attitude towards social shortcomings). The same remarks apply with slight variation to the counsel for the prosecution in a murder trial. The latter is bound, of course, to present his case in the most convincing manner to the jury, but he may also be so influenced by a prisoner's psychological character (that is, the prisoner's hostility towards society with which, like the judge, the counsel identifies himself by virtue of his office as prosecutor for the Crown) that he may, unknowingly, be unfair to the prisoner and take for granted in presenting his case that the prisoner is the actual murderer whom he is trying to prove him to be.

(4) FROM another point of view there is a possibility of unfairness to a man accused of murder, and of wrongful conviction, as long as psychological considerations are ignored in the presentation of evidence. The psychological study of murder cases and criminal mentality suggests, as stated above, that murder is only committed under certain definite conditions as part of a certain definite psychological situation. Although these conditions need to be more fully worked out, yet, in a case of conflicting evidence, a psychologist can at least surmise whether a murder was likely to have been committed by some particular person under the circumstances presented by the case. This is an important matter in itself. Further, by a psychological investigation it might be possible to ascertain whether that particular person was likely to have committed a murder even if the circumstances allowed of the psychological possibility of his having done so. Enquiries into family history, early environment, previous record and present social reactions (which would come to light in conversation with someone with whom the prisoner felt at ease) would show if there was such a psychological history behind the prisoner that the crime of murder was possible in his case.

POINTS 2, 3 and 4 are well illustrated by a recent murder case in which, as I believe, the man was wrongly convicted.

SOCIOLOGY AND MATHEMATICS : by Arthur F. Bentley.

I. THEIR COMMON PROBLEM OF ANALYSIS.

WHEN a paper is offered upon the subject of sociology and mathematics, one may reasonably expect it to discuss those many mathematical techniques which have so usefully been taken over by the social sciences, such as series, graphs, correlations, probabilities and other statistical methods : or, if not these, then those mathematical constructions of demand, price, money and competition which are known as pure economics. We shall have here, however, no concern with any of these topics.

SUCH mathematical techniques and constructions require, before they can be put to use, the provision by the social sciences of the statistical data, or, alternatively, of the postulational elements, with which they are to deal. These data and postulational elements in their turn require, before they can be assembled, or before they can be given precision, an analysis of the general situation to be investigated, and the determination of a scheme of classification. Mathematical techniques contribute nothing directly to the analysis : and the wider values of the results secured through the techniques are always dependent upon the adequacy of the antecedent classifications and postulatory fixations which the analysis has furnished¹ though it is of course true that work of this kind may often stimulate a return to the preliminary procedures of analysis.

SOCIOLOGY is much more than a manipulation of data assumed as factually well established and adequately provided for its use. Mathematics is much more than a compendium of technical devices.

MATHEMATICS is itself the great science of rigorous analysis : and to mathematics in this sense its own techniques are rather the by-products of its development than the living body of the science itself.

THE social sciences are the very ones among all departments of knowledge to-day in which the need of deeper and more far-reaching analysis is most keenly felt. Indeed, whether we have now, or in the future will have, a true science of sociology, is the same question as to ask whether the existing analyses of social situations are, or whether the future analyses will be, adequate for the wider generalisations which we require for our social studies and for our social work.

¹In making this statement I have directly in mind the present status of mathematical technique as exhibited, for example, by Griffith C. Evans in his *MATHEMATICAL INTRODUCTION TO ECONOMICS*, 1930, and by Irving Fisher, in his Willard Gibbs' lecture, "The Application of Mathematics to the Social Sciences," *BULLETIN OF THE AMERICAN MATHEMATICAL SOCIETY*, April, 1930. For an appraisal of the important work of Professor Evans, see Part II., Section 6, of this paper.

THE field of the social materials and theories which need better analysis, and its relation to the science of mathematics which is the possessor of maximum power of analysis, is the subject of attention in Part I. of the present paper: and it is the possibilities for mutual interaction between the two which I wish here briefly and tentatively to develop.

I IDENTIFY first of all a region of difficulty and obscurity which is common both to sociology and to mathematics.

DESPITE all of its great successes in many wide fields, and despite the maximum power which it possesses, mathematics has not yet finished its work of analysis for its own most general field. It has fully consistent constructions for its three great branches taken separately, for its Arithmetics and Algebras, for its Geometries, and for its special discipline of Analysis; but while it has offered many tentative—and some dogmatic—constructions to bring these three departments into consistent system with one another, it has secured as yet no generally acknowledged success. In Algebra and Arithmetic it long ago broke down the obstacles that seemed insuperable with respect to minus quantities, incommensurables and imaginaries: it has passed onwards to ideal numbers, has established algorithmic consistency, and has differentiated many types of algebras with their corresponding arithmetics. In Geometry, after destroying by deeper analysis the realism of the Euclidean parallels, it has gained enormous consistent development in many forms, metrical and non-metrical. In Analysis, which was itself created by Newton and Leibnitz under the influence of the wider analytic search to handle the phenomena of transitions, the long struggles over infinitesimals culminated, with Weierstrass, in consistency of statement of its procedures in the form of limits. But in the effort to bring all three departments together, despite the great logical system of Russell-Whitehead, despite the twenty-year struggle of Hilbert to establish *Widerspruchsfreiheit* in a construction of *Zeichen als Objekte*, and despite numerous minor experiments such as that of Brouwer, the paradoxes and the basic uncertainties still remain in every program of consistent construction for the general field.

THESE mathematical difficulties centre around the mathematical values of the common, every-day words, "one," "some," "many," "any," "all," and "none": and this is just another way of saying that they involve the problems of consistency, in the interior of the mathematical field, with respect to those issues much more pompously known as the finite and the infinite, the continuous and the discrete.

IF, now, we take the above list of common words, the "one" and the "any," the "some" and the "all," and carry it over into our region of sociological investigation, we have at once a set of sign-boards for our most difficult problems of scientific organisation—the issues of individual, of group, and of society, in all of their various linguistic

expressions, whether psychological, physiological or biological, or whether, indeed, immediately and directly sociological. A moment's pause will further make it clear that that other manner of phrasing in terms of finite and infinite, of continuous and discrete, is also involved for society: not, of course, in the more specifically arithmetical or geometrical usages, but in the vital characteristics of the analysis. Whenever, for example, we use such a phrase as "social ideals" we are struggling to express a continuity of social procedure across a discreteness of individual men: whenever we use the generalised term "society" we are involving something of an infinite in comparison with a finiteness of the individual.

It is true that this identity of problem centreing around the presentations¹ "one" and "some" and "all" in mathematics and in sociology is not often emphasised, perhaps indeed is not generally recognised. It is concealed from view beneath a very prevalent attitude and distinction under which mathematics is regarded as "abstract" in the extreme, while social presentations, by contrast, are regarded in their characteristic of immediate experience and behaviour as the most vitally "concrete" of all. If one accepts such a distinction of abstract and concrete as basically sound or true, and if, along with this, he regards the abstractness as implying a certain "unreality," while on the contrary the personal and social experiences seem to him to have the truest and fullest "reality," then he of course sees the problems of the two fields as of entirely different nature. But the distinction abstract-concrete is far from possessing theoretical rigor, whether in psychology and logic,² or in practical and scientific life: it is far from being a firm basis of classification within knowledge: and, beyond this, the implications of "reality" and "unreality" are even less secure in their meaning. Given any such uncertainty in these basic forms of discrimination, then the comparison and correlation of the problems of "one" and "some" and "all" in

¹I shall make frequent use of the word "presentations," employing it as the most nearly neutral term I can find, in place of such terms as phenomena, appearances, expressions, to indicate any portion of our experiential-linguistic materials of investigation. Where the term phenomena is used for convenience of phrasing in the text, it is to be understood in this sense.

²The attitude of this paper towards "logic" is that it is a specialised and limited technique of language. Such a status for logic may be suspected from the fact that, however dependable it has been in limited ranges, it has invariably in wider generalisations led to paradox. The demonstration of its limitations has been given by the mathematical research of the past generation. Mathematics has used logic more rigorously than has any other department of knowledge, and finally it has reached problems in which logic, for it, is in complete collapse. Hilbert and Ackermann have shown fully in their *GRUNDZÜGE DER THEORETISCHEN LOGIK* (1928) that if logic is to handle mathematical "fact," it must operate upon various levels or "Stufen" which as between themselves lack logical coherence. Hilbert's proposed construction of consistency, his *Widerspruchsfreiheit*, rests in a broader linguistic development. So also, though in a different way, does the construction of semantic consistency used in this paper. Reference should also be made to Russell's theory of types, and to Brouwer's proposed limitation of one of the Aristotelian canons.

these two regions, mathematical and sociological, becomes at once of the greatest importance: and the way is open for an inquiry as to whether any light may be thrown by the situation in one of the regions upon that in the other.

IN mathematics the pertinent problems of such investigation have come to be called by the special name "foundation theory": and the interpretative constructions thereunder make use of three general terms, or names, or categories, which designate three kinds of materials or presentations found most important in the study: these three being Things (or Objects), Relations, and Operations. Mere mention of these words involves a cloud of discussion, logical, metaphysical, philosophical, psychological, epistemological. We shall disregard all this discussion as though it simply did not exist, and shall confine ourselves to examining what these three kinds of materials include as presentations within the body of mathematical knowledge itself, and to bringing them into system within that particular body of knowledge.

THE mathematical Thing—which is, of course, to be taken as "abstract" in the extreme values of whatever it is that the word "abstract" indicates or implies—is any separate or distinct presentation used as a fixed base or reference for further development. It may be the natural number, such as 1, 2, 3, . . . n : it may be a line-segment or solid: it may be a group, a vector or a tensor.

THE mathematical Relation appears in such simple forms as odd, even or prime: it covers geometrical propositions: and it rises to include the "great relational certainties" of mathematics: so that in the end it may come to mean even the structure of mathematics itself.

THE mathematical Operation is everywhere present. Plus and times are operations⁴ and arithmetic is operational clear through to the most complex operators of infinite series. Algebra is throughout operational. In the geometries, no matter how strenuously the relational structure is emphasised, there remain always the operational procedures: all use of translations and rotations, all appeal, frankly or implicitly, to motion, and, in general, all that has to do with congruence, is operational. Differential and integral calculus have been the cause of much worried speculation over many generations, due to the fact that they appear so wholly operational in their nature, and so little concerned with fixations or relations of Thing, that the discomfort of the theorist becomes acute.

⁴Whitehead, indeed, in his useful little book, *AN INTRODUCTION TO MATHEMATICS*, p. 81, said, with regard to these, that the operational interpretation was the only one that would everywhere hold, a remark which we need not here attempt to bring into adjustment with *Principia Mathematica*.

IN their constructions the mathematical foundation theories choose, now one, now the other, of these three categories or presentations, as basis: the logical systems pick, in effect, the Relation as fundamental: Hilbert chooses the Thing, or Object: while Brouwer (under the influence of Kronecker and Poincare) made an effort, especially in the earlier stages of his development, to use the Operation. It is by the aid of these terms that the foundation theories present constructions to handle the difficulties of "one" and of "some" and of "all." But what is most strikingly significant is that none of these systems has brought forth a consistent and thorough interpretation of the terms Thing, Relation and Operation themselves, with respect to one another, definitely within their mathematical development. They have taken over the terms as they have found them in conventional extraneous (and very questionable) uses, and they have applied them to mathematical phenomena, but they have not as yet subjected them to direct and exhaustive mathematical analysis under the standards of mathematical consistency itself.* They are straining to this end, but have not as yet gained it. The deficiency is all the more notable since the most important of these systems all aim to establish forms of consistency which will reach far beyond the specific mathematical field, and which will, if established, dominate the development of all knowledge whatsoever.

IF we now turn once more from mathematics to sociology, we shall recognise, just as in the case of "one," "some" and "all," that these three presentations, Thing, Relation and Operation, are similarly essential, directly or by implicit use, to all our sociological constructions, and are similarly lacking as yet in thorough internal analysis. In other words, what these three terms really *mean* with respect to one another, and what they are, or turn out to *be* in the consistencies of language, will in the end be criterion for such sociological success or failure as we may secure. That the situation is still very obscure in this respect will be admitted, I think, by all sociologists, except those, probably, who develop their work from some dogmatic Absolute, or those others who use an equally dogmatic biologically-individual basis. We have had sociologies of Things, both men-things and society-things, sociologies of Relation between men-things, and very much sociological development on an Operational basis. Whether the group is itself a Thing for sociology, whether it is a Relation between men-things, or whether it is a social Operation, and in what sense it is any or all of these, is just our most fundamental problem of analysis.

MY own conclusion has been that terms of these three types in sociology must be taken in system with one another, so that their meanings

*The obstacles which have operated to hinder progress, and the reorganisation of postulatory materials which is needed, are discussed at length in my monograph, *SYMBOL AND MEANING IN MATHEMATICS*, shortly to be published.

may be understood, not through some dogmatic superimposed definition, but in their actual scientific-sociological organisation: and in especial that this is crucial for the terms, individual and society, so that each of these terms is in a very significant sense a limiting expression in the development of the other.*

APPLYING this method of approach to the mathematical constructions of Thing, Relation and Operation, and remembering further that mathematics itself is a social procedure and production, it is possible to generalise mathematical analysis in a manner which may be called Semantic, since thereby the meanings of all of its terms are brought into linguistic (and, in the limit, into symbolic) system with one another.⁷ This yields a construction in mathematical consistency in which we find (a) that Relations present themselves sometimes as Things and sometimes as Operations, and this to such extent that they may be regarded as reducible to these other two forms, though always with the right to hold them separate for a time in some special branch of study as desired: and (b) that any particular presentation has the possibility of appearing either as Thing or as Operation with respect to other presentations, which then in their turn appear respectively as either Operation or as Thing with respect to the one first taken. This means, for example, that the 1, 2, 3, of mathematics are not to be taken for algorithmic mathematical purposes as "realities" in any sense "external" to it, but as developments of its operational system of equation in the full spirit of Poincaré's induction: that the axiom constructions of geometry become wholly systemic, each within itself, without specialised foundation in either separated Thing, separated Relation or separated Operation, the forms in which we commonly find them: that Calculus no longer needs futile struggles to pin it to realistic bases, but operates in its own semantic right: and that all

*See "New Ways and Old to Talk about Men," THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW, October, 1929: "L'individuel et le social: les termes et les faits," REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE SOCIOLOGIE, Mai-Juin, 1929: and the development in Part II. of the present paper.

⁷Professor Geddes has called my attention to the writings of Lady Victoria Welby and to her theory of Significs. While the values with which she was concerned and her goals of investigation were very different from mine, I find pleasure in acknowledging a great similarity of attitude, which will be very clearly evident in such citations as the following from her book, WHAT IS MEANING?: "All systems inevitably concentrate in Significance as their essential value as well as test: and thus Significs alone gives us the power of inter-translation": "Significs gives us the right to postulate Man as in a true sense the expression of the world": "The true answers to our most vital Whys can only come through a long stern searching discipline of unanswered question": "We must look forward to the substitution of the Significian for the Metaphysician": and with respect to a particular detail of construction: "Infinity merely thinks away space, as Eternity does time." I could cite passages from her writings in regard to mind and psychology which would be even more significant of sympathy in approach, but I omit them, since her much desired Significs has made so little progress in the world in general, that among the many possible specialised readings of the language she uses, the wrong ones would be much more commonly taken than those her context itself indicates.

of these three divisions of mathematics gain systemic organisation with one another free from inconsistency or conflict.

A CONSTRUCTION of this kind, when once developed for mathematics, becomes in turn of the greatest aid to more thorough analysis in sociology, since it widens and generalises the suggested systemic treatment of Thing and Operation in the special cases of man, of group and of society, and provides new technical aids for dealing with those special fixations of social Thing which, however important they may have been in the past, and however useful they remain for special purposes in the present, have become hurtful when too rigidly adopted in general sociological theory.* The value of this construction will be shown in the second part of this paper through an investigation of the problem of space in sociology: and, no matter how far this investigation may fall short of completeness at its present stage, it will most plainly be made manifest that we have here to do with a great complex of problems submissive to sociological analysis, and not to be arbitrarily brushed aside by the insistence on some conventional "idea" of space, nor by the rigid application of some space offered by a physical science. We shall find not only spaces which are taken as "external" to the individual or to society, but also spaces which are peculiarly social, and, so to speak, "internal" to society itself: those separations, distributions and mensurations of men, groups, institutions, yielded by social observation itself: and we shall find no assurance that any one of these spaces, whether "internal" or "external" is dogmatically "thing" or "fact" to which all others must adapt themselves.

BEFORE attacking these problems let us consider a somewhat different characterisation of the semantic point of approach from that above: this time especially with reference to the term "fact," a term which is necessary for use in all our studies, and which must be given a meaning free from misinterpretation. The semantic approach may be generalised by saying that it is a determination to secure full consistency of expression in and through language, *before* attributing realistic value or assigning basic factual reference to any of the particular terms which the language of the investigation includes. It is an approach which permits, for special purposes and at special times, the isolation of any of these particular terms, and the attribution to them

*This semantic construction, or method, is not, of course, confined to mathematics and sociology. To be valid for these it must be capable of use in handling the problems of fact and theory in physics, which, just at the present day, with corpuscle and radiation in conflict, are especially acute: and it must likewise furnish helpful aid for biology and psychology: since in all of these departments of knowledge the issues of "one," of "many" and of "all," of "thing," of "relation" and of "operation" are ever intruding. Into the problems of these other sciences we fortunately have no need of entering here.

*For a discussion of "external" and "internal" see the last paragraphs of Part II., Section 5, following.

of factual value for the special study undertaken, but which does not permit the attribution to any term whatever of basic factual value for the general purposes of all knowledge,—not, at any rate, under the particular stage of ignorance in which we exist to-day. It asserts that so long and so far as inconsistencies and paradoxes remain in the linguistic expression, just so long and so far the realistic attributions are uncertain, and, being uncertain, are unjustified. This approach does not interfere with the right of any person to make any realistic constructions which he desires, and it enters no objection whatever against the making of them. It merely insists on radical severance between procedures in terms of realisms, and its own type of work which proceeds through integrity of expression. On its own side it fully recognises, employs, and cannot get along without, specifications of fact, but it makes these specifications cautiously for the particular purposes in hand, not dogmatically as in control of knowledge in general.¹⁰

IF we inspect the prevalent uses of the term fact and of that "factuality" which it is supposed to present, we may spread them out in a sort of linguistic spectrum. In the middle ranges of this spectrum we will put the various shadings and degrees of fact in its sense of practical dependability for whatever it is in the way of investigation or work upon which we may be engaged. To the left hand we may throw the increasingly dogmatic renderings or understandings of factuality, running to extreme realisms or absolutisms of meaning at the far left end. To the right hand we may throw the more cautious and hypothetical renderings of factuality, ranging onwards to full postulatory construction, with those of mathematical fact at the far right end, where we find the permanent dependability of 1, 2, 3, the invariance of π , the certain outcome of the sum of two naturals, or the value of the sum of two angles of a Euclidean plane triangle. Astonishingly enough we observe the maximum human vigor in assertion of factuality at the extreme left, but the greatest certainty in the employment of factuality at the extreme right. At the extreme left, moreover, is the least consistency of language: at the extreme right, the greatest consistency of language, which here takes the form of full symbolic expression.

THE identity of problem in the use of the term fact in the above organisation with that of the term thing in a system of things, relations and operations, is sufficiently evident. For our purposes in this paper, the term "fact" must be read without realistic values, its range of meaning must be limited within the context of its use, and its claims to dominance in knowledge must be held in subordination to the linguistic consistency of its use.

¹⁰See also the final paragraphs of Part II., Section 3.

II. MATHEMATICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL SPACES.

A GENERATION ago any discussion in the field we now approach would have used the term "space" directly in confrontation with the term "society," and would not have introduced the plural form "spaces." Such a phrasing would have signified that the discussion concerned itself with space and with society as though they were two fundamental facts to be brought into relation.

TO-DAY various spaces are used in the physical sciences, while behind them is a great array of mathematical spaces upon which the physical sciences draw for aid.

WHAT import this situation may have for sociology is here to be examined.

I. *The Terminologies of Space.*

SPACES are before us for examination in systems of words, among which words the highly specialised "symbols" of mathematics and physics are to be included. If there are several spaces under consideration we keep them distinct to our attention by differentiations of the systems of words used for them. Such systems of words we may be permitted to call terminologies. Each space, or each presentation of space (for in our plan of study we have no dogmatic primary severance between the two, whatever form of construction may ultimately be developed), has therefore its own terminology: and each such space-terminology is to be understood as including all its own special modulations of ordinary language, as, for example, its special application of the verb "to be," an application which is clearly very different in a physical space from a social space, and very different in a mathematical space from either of the others. If we wish to decide whether any two spaces are "the same" or "not the same," we must do it then not by personal dictum, but by full analysis of the space-terminologies: and our final decision must involve an understanding of what we mean by "the same" as well as what we mean by the spaces we are comparing.

We may inspect five such terminologies which are important to us here, and we may name them vulgar space, mathematical space, physical space, social space, and sociological space.¹¹

By vulgar space¹² we shall understand any system of space which is expressed and accepted by the people of any specified social time and social place¹³ as "external" to them, and as the physical locus in which

¹¹If any one insists that "actual space" should also be investigated he may add it as a special terminology of its own under that name, and proceed to its treatment.

¹²The word vulgar is to be read with its older English values.

¹³For social time and social place see Section 5, following.

they find themselves : and which is embodied in their current meanings of pertinent words, and taken in account in their own understanding of their own practical life. It carries always a conventional implication of, or dogmatic insistence upon, its factuality : which implication or insistence is here taken as part of the terminology, and in especial as the range of meaning of the verb " to be " as this verb is employed within it.

By mathematical space we shall understand the various constructions in full symbolic form which mathematicians have developed, beginning historically with Euclidean space, passing thence into the non-Euclidean spaces, and including the still more recent topological spaces.

By physical spaces we shall understand those mathematical spaces which at any given social time and social place are taken by physicists as best organising the results of physical and astronomical observation and experiment. For an earlier generation, Newtonian space was the sole member of this group, but Newtonian space now appears as one member among many.¹⁴

By social spaces we shall understand those discretenesses and continuities, those separations and distributions and purely social mensurations, which are found among men outspread in societies.

By sociological spaces we shall understand theoretical constructions which, with respect to social spaces, hold a position comparable to that of mathematical spaces with respect to physical spaces.

It will be observed that the form of phrasing used to describe the social and sociological spaces differs sharply from that used to describe the physical and mathematical spaces. This difference corresponds to the difference in degree of development of these two types of investigation at the present time : the physical and mathematical spaces having fact and theory in close technical organisation, the social and sociological spaces resting rather in crude description and tentative construction.

ONE may isolate a special region within any one of these space terminologies for detached study, as, for example, within mathematics, an Euclidean space : or one may study the system of each terminology by itself : but in the full extent of scientific development across generations, it is evident that efforts must and will be made to bring them all into consistent interpretation with one another ; and that this again will involve clarification of the uses of the verb " to be " in its most general scientific meanings for all of them, as distinct from either its practical involvements or its philosophical pretences.

¹⁴Geographical space, especially as taken in system with geological time, might be subsumed under the physical terminologies, or added as a special terminology itself. It is, however, common meeting ground of vulgar, physical and social spaces, deeply rooted in these last named, and will be allowed to receive interpretation and valuation through these others.

2. *The Circle of Interpretation.*

Two great trends or directions of investigation will be at once remarked when we make the beginnings of an effort to examine all of these space terminologies and bring them into organisation.

On the one side, the physical and mathematical spaces are forms of knowledge: but knowledge itself is manifestly a social development, a process or a product according as you take it: and therefore the entire development of physics and mathematics falls within the scope of the most general sociological study.

On the other side, any sociology that we may establish will manifestly be conditioned by physics and mathematics, because it itself is a part of knowledge, and the physics and mathematics are more richly and securely established parts of that knowledge than it is. Sociological development will be conditioned by the physical spaces insofar as these latter become firmly established as forms of basic physical fact. It will be conditioned by the mathematical spaces insofar as these latter in their most highly generalised or "abstract" presentations furnish patterns for sociological space constructions.

We have here a circle in scientific research which we may as well recognise for what it is.¹⁴ It is not a vicious circle of logic, involving its conclusion in its premises, but a situation before us for investigation, demanding maximum clarity and consistency of analysis. We can break the circle by a dictum, but we break progress in knowledge at the same time. As between the two complementary trends in our work, the two "directions" within it, we are free to choose which we will, and to work with our choice, but we have no power to place either such choice in full control of all knowledge. Using the general construction for linguistic knowledge set up in Part I. of this paper, we have in the present situation merely to say that we may take either set of presentations as basic "fact" or "thing," and work operatively into the interpretation of the other set. If dominance of the one over the other is ultimately to be established, there is no manifestation of it in knowledge as yet.

3. *Vulgar Space.*

If, on the one side, the physical and mathematical spaces are proper starting points for the study of social and sociological spaces: while,

¹⁴For a descriptive expression akin to the theoretical position here asserted (but not at all involving its authors in any imperfection of my present generalisation) see Geddes and Thomson, *BIOLOGY*, p. 139: "Our vast dream-Palace of the Life-Science is next seen to shrink, and shrink again—at length into a tiny sphere—the unit-cell of knowledge, yet packed with all its heredities: for it is now the microcosm of mind, within the Macrocosm of Nature. Yet again this process reverses: for the human Mind is ever extending anew, and cannot cease to grow, towards the ever fuller ensphering of Nature which is the aim of science." Compare also in specific application, *Ibid.*, pp. 178-9; 237-8; 242.

on the other side, sociology is a proper starting point for the investigation of physics and mathematics as knowledge: what, now, are we to say of that other terminology of space which we have listed above, namely, vulgar space? Involved is the question as to whether such a vulgar space furnishes some criterion by which the physical, mathematical, social and sociological spaces are to be tested, or some goal of interpretation towards which the sciences dealing with these latter must strive.

A vulgar space has been defined as any system of space popularly characterised and accepted at some specified social time and social place as an "actual" "external" space. The inquiry which first presents itself is whether we can identify many such vulgar spaces or only a single one in our field of study. We know, of course, that there are many popular forms of description for space, and our question, more loosely phrased, is one as to whether the human race possesses and uses one sole "external" space construction which is its true vulgar space, and with respect to which all the expressions of particular social time and social places are but adumbrations: or whether, on the contrary, it is more accurate, and scientifically more useful, to say that these forms of expression fall into groups identified by particular social times and social places, each of which groups is before us as a distinct vulgar space. Since none of these varying space expressions has as yet attained consistency, and since all of them still involve paradoxes, such an inquiry must incidentally face the question as to whether these inconsistencies and paradoxes are of any deep significance, or whether they are to be disregarded as mere quibbles of language, which are certain to be disentangled by human ingenuity in due course of time.

THE vulgar space which first comes to mind, indeed the sole vulgar space of which most readers will think of their own accord, is that which has been prevalent for the last two hundred years. It is a vulgar space which has close affiliations in its terminological development with Newtonian physical space and with Euclidean geometry. It makes use by implication (and, at times, explicitly) of Euclidean straight lines, of infinite line extension, and of three "real" dimensions, as characteristics of an "actual" space, which it regards as basic frame for stellar systems, earth, life and mind. Herein it sees "fact," and it bothers not at all with the paradoxes of continuity and infinity, or at most regards them as a pastime: and, while it "locates" the vivid psychic life of men and society in this frame, it cannot develop the "psychic" under its spatial terminology; but, quite to the contrary, resists vehemently any project of extending that terminology, including such items as foot-rules, over the psychic life: satisfying itself in the meantime with ancillary constructions which it calls "theological"

or "philosophical." None of this interferes, however, with its own factuality of belief and realism of expression.

LET us now separate the realism from the terminological construction : or, more exactly, since the realistic reference is itself a feature of the vulgar terminology, let us give attention to the terminology as itself specifically comprising its own internal realistic reference and assertion : and let us set off to one side, as not in any way concerning us here, any desire of our own to pass judgment upon the realism on the basis of further realistic tests or procedures. We may signalise this specialisation of attitude by describing the prevalent vulgar space as an "externalised" space, instead of speaking of it either as "external" or as "realistically external."¹⁶

LET us first ask ourselves whether the prevalent vulgar space as above described is the sole or exclusive vulgar space of the present age, or whether it has rivals among the populations of to-day. To answer even such an apparently easy question, involving only first-hand description, and to answer it with any degree of precision, will require, however, much better scientific technique than we to-day possess. It will require not only such initial constructions of social and sociological spaces as are discussed in Sections 4 and 5 following, but a considerable degree of advancement in the use of them. The best we can do with our present equipment is to point out that philosophers belong to our existing populations, as members or elements, and that they in their various ways envisage things very differently : so also do physicists engaged in the more recent developments of their science and so also at the far extreme do the depressed and unlettered elements of the population, among which there are great numbers of men who have never had such a construction as that of straight lines in infinite extension brought before their attention, and who inspect all that is about them concretely in masses of experience without the use of any such generalised form : while still beyond these are the outlying primitive populations maintaining tribal tradition in various forms. A guiding clue to a measured statement of fact with regard to all this complicated presentment is lacking to us, and we will pass it by, letting its issues be subsumed under those of the historical-evolutionary series next to be considered.

LOOKING backwards over history we find similar variations : and many ethnologists and sociologists have described space systems used by

¹⁶For further development of precision among terms of this type see Section 5, following. For aught I know or care the prevalent vulgar space of the present day may be the true, ultimate, eternal and absolute representation of "reality" : though considering the rival vulgar spaces of the past, the probable rivals of the future, and its own internal inconsistencies, such an outcome would be a most striking coincidence. The problem of "reality" is simply not our problem in this paper, which is the more humble one of investigating the linguistic consistencies—the knowledge—that we have of various space presentations, among which this particular vulgar space appears before us as one.

primitive peoples which are sharply different from our own vulgar space. In especial Durkheim has emphasised some of these in discussing the objective social origin of what he calls "categories": and we shall return in a moment to the consideration of some of the direct predecessors of our present vulgar space.

INSPECTING pre-human or collateral evolutionary lines we find indications of still more variant spatial presentations. The space of a dog is commonly described, under the best approximations of study, as a running flat space, with strong smell orientations, in contrast with the human three-dimensional space with slight smell orientations. Behind these, moreover, are insect spaces, taken to be in all probability specifically smell-spaces, with slight accompanying visual orientation: and behind these again we may suspect in still lower forms of life radiant space orientation, wholly lacking in specific sense differentiation.

HERE are phenomena which can manifestly be brought into array, on a provisional level, with the series of human vulgar spaces in one long evolutionary line. Let us put them in such array, merely for the purposes of preliminary study, without at this stage presuming to imply for a moment that such an array is the best structural array, or phenomenally the most "fundamental." It may still turn out to be true, despite the indications of this array, that all the human vulgar spaces can be reduced to adumbrations of one characteristically human space presentation, and more particularly to a space which takes physiological or psychological interpretation. Such a reduction would divide our phenomena into two groups on such a basis that the separation of the groups might have more import for our investigation than the similarities which caused us to establish the array. We shall return to a consideration of the physiological and psychological space problem later. Here I wish to stress merely this one observation that if such a reduction is made, then the exact point at which the human space differentiates from the non-human or pre-human becomes of great significance, since once such a differentiation has been identified by the scientist as critical then all the human vulgar spaces must hold together for him in one coherent group or sub-group, the characteristics of which must be entirely clear and unmistakable in contrast with the non-human space constructions. Under the array which I have set up, we have, on the contrary, no requirement of such a sharp point of severance: we can content ourselves with the full evolutionary-historical series, and if by chance we find a more radical differentiation, or what seems to us to be a more radical differentiation, as between certain members of the human series than we find as between the most primitive human and the pre-human members, we are not thrown into complete disorder and compelled to begin all over again from the ground up.

KEEPING this point well in mind we turn now to a consideration of evidence which we can examine with a much firmer hand, and with more exact critical decision. It has to do with the rise or appearance in society of exactly that vulgar space which we have called the prevalent vulgar space of the present time, namely the presentation of an external world in a form in general popular accord with Newtonian physics and Euclidean geometry. It is a common view that what Euclid did for the geometry of the things around him, and what Newton did for celestial and global space, was merely to bring out "theoretically," "abstractly," or "scientifically," the "truth" of what was crudely known to all men in a vulgar way. Is this view correct? If it is correct, we have preliminary evidence in favour of one sole "human" vulgar space, to which all other vulgar spaces of society can be reduced. If it is not correct, then we have instead evidence for the view that there exist and have existed in society many vulgar spaces not reducible to a single space.

WE may depend here for guidance on the development by Albert Einstein in his lecture at Nottingham University, June 7, 1930,¹⁷ in which he discussed geometrical and physical spaces and space-time. For the Greeks, he pointed out, geometry was a science of rigid bodies: the material bodies were "things": space was not a "thing," but solely a "relation" between such bodies. This status lasted long, so that even when Descartes set up his co-ordinates, these co-ordinates did not present a separate factuality of space, but solely a generalised relationship. It was not until Newton, we are told, that space as itself a "thing" was introduced into physics, taking its place, along with the absolute Newtonian time, as another "thing" additional to the matter-things.

EINSTEIN, of course, had no thought of vulgar spaces in this discussion. But when he shows the appearance of Newtonian space as a "thing" (or, in other words, for the uses we are making of it, as an identifiably separate "fact") at a definite date in scientific history: when the space-thing that then appeared is so closely comparable with the vulgar space of to-day that the latter may readily be regarded as its non-technical analogue in colloquial expression: when the pre-Newtonian scientific space had no reference to anything comparable to our present vulgar space, but was instead only a thin, technical relationship between bodies (the term "relation" having here precisely the value of "not-thing"): when an evolutionary-historical series of other space presentations can be shown behind our present vulgar space: then we have a strong case for regarding our present "externalised" vulgar space as depending in some way upon Newtonian scientific space, possibly in some sense as its by-product: and we have more evidence

¹⁷NATURE, June 14th, 1930, p. 897; SCIENCE, June 13th, 1930, p. 608.

for the reduction of our present vulgar space to the position of one space among many. In this background it is perhaps possible, but hardly probable, and certainly not to be presumed—when we consider the close relationships in development and interaction between scientific knowledge, common media of language, and practical work and living—that what we have called the prevalent vulgar space of to-day, with its Newtonian affiliations, was, in its essence, and with mere unimportant differences of expression, the factual vulgar space of earlier ages, running back not merely to the Greeks, but vastly further to that stage in evolution at which differentia between the human and the pre-human are introduced. It is much more probable, and certainly the proper presumption upon the basis of the showing above, that our prevalent vulgar space, inclusive of its “externalised” reference and its pretence of “actuality,” is merely one social form among the many which need to be taken into account by sociology.

To have a presumption of this kind, however, does not settle the matter by any means, even though it adds its strength to the array in the evolutionary-historical series that has been set forth above. We have still to take into account the status of that specifically “human” physiological or psychological space referred to before as a possible criterion of procedure. To settle the issues herein involved, investigations will be necessary which will run into the widest fields, and which will doubtless require long periods of time before they are completed. Such investigations, however, will be worthless unless they are undertaken upon an impartial and unbiased basis: a basis which does not simply accept the frame of interpretation set up by the psychologies and physiologies of to-day as though it were safely and certainly “fundamental,” but which inquires into the derivation and range of usefulness of that very frame itself: so that a greater breadth of interpretation can be secured. Here only a few indications of the problems at issue can be given.

A CENTRAL point of investigation is the extent to which the prevalent vulgar space, itself having Euclidean-Newtonian origins, has entered into and conditioned the construction of both the psychologies and the physiologies, which psychologies and physiologies in their turn are appealed to as authority for upholding this particular vulgar space as the sole true “human” space itself.

ALL our psychology as a science is post-Newtonian, and we know very well how Kant was conditioned by Newton, and how Locke developed in that type of intellectual environment we call Newtonian.¹⁸ Much

¹⁸We have here a problem of “social times” much richer in meaning than “clock times.” Einstein, holding to geometry and to physics and to space as “thing,” can use Newton’s date in the calendar to fix his reference. The sociologist does not inspect solely the “Newton” and the “date,” but must use much more subtly the developmental time and procedure of the society itself.

light is thrown upon the situation by recent philological-philosophical exhibits of the development and transformation stages of our modern "inner" psychic terminology from the very objective and "external" Greek and Latin beginnings.¹⁹

WHEN we turn to physiology which is so freely used in guaranteeing the foundations of a specifically "human" space, we find that this science is itself constructed in a Newtonian space form, to which it dogmatically holds, and to which it is confident that it will in the end reduce all its theory: despite the fact that its own inner aspects of organisation—all that which it means by "life" itself—have never yet been given a consistent Newtonian statement: so that to-day the vitalisms and mechanistic structures of the biological sciences still struggle with one another as speculations and as temperamental attitudes and beliefs, rather than as true components of a family of scientific procedures.

HERE now we have indications that even the physiological, the psychological, the sensuous, the "accepted human" space is a construction of and within linguistic knowledge: and that therefore it loses its right to regard itself as established "foundation" fact authorised to control and dominate the development of other reaches of knowledge in all that concerns their space presentations.

I SAY we have indications, and I mean just exactly that, and nothing more. I do not regard the case as proven by any means: indeed what we have here is the kind of an issue which will most probably be resolved in the end, not by a decision in favour of one side or the other, but by an entirely different and deeper construction which will interpret both. But merely to possess such indications in the strength that they have, is to cause us to pass far beyond the naïve view that in any conventional current space we have a direct reference to "reality." And this not only makes it possible for us, but it makes it our duty, to pursue investigations from both points of view. Take away the naïve identification of the physiological or psychological "human" space with the prevalent vulgar space regarded as its best approximation in ordinary language, and at once that prevalent vulgar space falls to the position we have assigned it, of one vulgar space among many. Incidentally it becomes at once clear that the paradoxes of this vulgar space can no longer be disregarded as something which,

¹⁹See, for example, O. O. Norris, "A Behaviourist Account of Intelligence," and "A Behaviourist Account of Consciousness," *THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY*, XXV., p. 700, and XXVI., p. 29, p. 57, for the development of such terms as "intelligence" from sources of picking and choosing: of "consciousness" from orientations of knowing: of "quality" from objectivity of kinds: and, on the Germanic side, of "meaning" from pointing. The whole "psychic" terminology, with all its implication and reference, is a development within language, always inconsistent, hardly of fundamental or permanent import, and much more probably a transitional phenomenon, despite some hundreds of years, or a thousand or two, of history.

we may take it for granted, will be resolved or smoothed away in due time, but that they are standing challenges against the use of the prevalent vulgar space for generalised or dogmatic purposes until they have been cleared away, or until a construction is substituted which does not drag them in with it.

WE now revert to the question suggested in the first paragraph of this section as to whether the prevalent vulgar space, or indeed any vulgar, space, furnishes some criterion by which the physical, mathematical social and sociological spaces are to be tested, or some goal towards which the sciences which deal with these latter must strive. Postponing to the next section that part of this inquiry which concerns physical and mathematical spaces, we consider here merely the purported right of this vulgar space to dominance over sociological construction. To this question we have no dogmatic answer. What the ultimate outcome in knowledge will be does not concern us, but only the present situation of investigation in which our requirement is that of the highest efficiency. As for this intermediate problem of scientific investigation it might well be the case that even after the prevalent vulgar space had been reduced to the status of one social formation among many, it would still remain the best kind of space for sociological construction. Here, however, there is a great accumulation of evidence that it wholly fails to perform its service. During the last two generations there has been huge development in the way of enlarging the picture of the social part of the "contents" of space. What we call institutions comprise a great part of our sociological materials, and though we take these institutions as if located and evolved in a spatial world, we simply cannot give them any spatial construction of the Newtonian or vulgar kinds whatever. All that vague field called "social psychology," which is treated as though in some sense "external" to the individual, is nevertheless not "external" in the sense of the vulgar space. For all of these materials, and, in general, for all of sociology, some better space form than the vulgar space is required, if consistency is to be reached. Constructions of society have been attempted as a relation, as an operation, and as a thing: none of them has been satisfactory, and the reason is that all of them have been erected in a conventional, an inadequate, and—so far as the problems in hand are directly concerned—a fictitious space.

THE answer then is that the prevalent vulgar space furnishes neither criterion nor goal for sociology, and that it can only hamper sociological construction where it insists on dominating it.²⁰ This answer requires, however, two forms of qualification. The first is that the prevalent vulgar space is unquestionably the most convenient frame

²⁰This attitude does not destroy the vulgar space as "fact" within its own range, but re-interprets it under the construction of local point-of-view discussed in Section 5, following.

for the accumulation of first-hand sociological data, and for much of the provisional classification of data. The second is that if sociology adopts for its most general construction some different spatial frame, some frame specially devised by and within itself for its own purposes, then it must also at the same time devise adequate technical methods for transforming reports under its own frame into reports under the vulgar frame, and vice versa. It must be able to transform from one set of linguistic co-ordinates to the other, somewhat as mathematics makes transformations within its own field. This is a requirement which will receive further attention in a later section of this paper.

It may perhaps help in the appraisal of the above conclusion to consider the issue in the form of the query: "Is space a fact?" a query which, more fully expressed, becomes: "Is space, either in the form we have called the prevalent vulgar space, or in the form we have called the physiological or psychological 'human' space, a fact?" This query, now, on the basis of the remarks about fact at the end of Part I., must be subdivided into two. On one side, one asks: "Is space, as it stands, or in itself, or for all general basic purposes of knowledge, a fact?" On the other side, one asks: "Is such space a basic fact for sociology?" We disregard the first form of the query as entirely beyond our province, and consider only the second. Here we can appraise our answer by considering what it is that is meant by a basic fact, not merely for sociology, but for any kind of science. We note two contrasted attitudes which men habitually take as to science. One attitude is that science deals with facts: the other is that science is the system of the discovery of fact. Conflict between the two attitudes arises only when science in its process of discovery brings about the displacement of data which, under the first attitude, had been accepted as basic fact. Such conflicts have been innumerable in the history of the development of knowledge, and will doubtless continue. There is nothing radically new in the present situation. Always there are vehement upholders of the basic nature of the old "facts": always there is violent resistance to rearrangement in terms of new "facts": and for that matter no prejudice need be implied either in behalf of the "old" or the "new," since either may well prove to be inferior to the other, or even "wrong." Consider the situation of a sociology which perhaps existed under Ptolemaic astronomy and Ptolemaic space: what would have been its attitude towards a reorganisation of itself in terms of Copernican astronomy, or, later on, Newtonian space? We do not need to guess: it is sufficient to substitute for such a sociology another comparable form of interpretation of human life, namely a theology, and we at once know the answer.

TURNING to the physical sciences, the atom, forty years ago, was a speculation, an hypothesis: in the course of a life-time we have seen it pass through two other stages, first becoming firmly established as

basic fact, then being transformed into a derivative or appearance of basic facts, which now in their turn are inspected as basic. Just to-day physics, facing the conflicting results of the Compton and the Davisson-Germer experiments, is uncertain whether to regard the corpuscle or the ray, or neither, or both, as basic facts. Physicists may writhe as they feel what is in their hands, but they do not deeply worry: they trust to the development of their knowledge itself to bring them their answers. Newtonian space in physics has taken its turn in transformation, and has become approximation to better formulations in space-time: and now it may be that the vulgar form of the Newtonian space may have to yield its claim to the basic fact for social studies. Indeed, as vulgar form itself, it has no certainty of continuing on into coming generations: and the steady spread of variant attitudes among physicists and mathematicians, not merely as technical devices, but as ways of looking at the world around them, is a fair warrant that it will not.

4. *Mathematical and Physical Spaces as Social.*

OUR discussion of vulgar space systems has gone just far enough to destroy the illusion that the particular way in which men in any given age look upon the factuality of space—including the way in which our own age looks upon it—is final and conclusive for the general purposes of investigation. The reader who regards "space" as one certain and definite existence, who regards the individual "mind" as another certain and definite existence which makes definite individual contact with that "space," and who regards all of his language and knowledge structures as mere incidental approximations to the "truth" about it, will have difficulty in following the further argument: for his are just the propositions with respect to which we have now shattered the dogmatic claims. For such a reader any "success" which the science of physics attains or may hope to attain will be tested in the end by the way in which it upholds his own peculiar space presentation: just as any "success" which he will attribute to the sciences of psychology or sociology will be measured by similar standards. Such, very certainly, is not our attitude and criterion here.

WE have next to consider the mathematical and physical spaces as social developments and constructions, and to bring them, so inspected, into relation, first to vulgar space, and then to a science of sociology. Here we make use of the first of the two trends or directions of investigation which we identified in Section 2, preceding: that, namely, which regards mathematics and physics, and all of their content and reference and delivery, as part of knowledge, and this knowledge as social process or product:²¹ and which undertakes to appraise these sciences from this point of approach.

²¹The distinction process and product need not concern us in this paper. Where desirable, it is of course to be set up and understood semantically, on the basis of the postulational choice of a basic "fact" or "thing" for a particular purpose of inquiry.

Now, so far as the mathematical spaces are concerned, a word will suffice. The popular attitude makes mathematics "abstract" in the extreme as contrasted with the "concrete" parts of knowledge: and, however weak this distinction theoretically is, it serves as a label to place the mathematical spaces under investigation as knowledge and from the sociological approach. Both from this popular point of view, which differentiates the subject matters of science, and from our own differentiation of attitudes of approach, the mathematical spaces therefore appear as social processes or products. We may postpone any further consideration of them until we return in a later section to an examination of the manner in which they may be helpful to sociological space construction.

WITH respect to the physical spaces we must however ask several questions. In what sense are they submissive to the control of vulgar space? In what sense are they social procedures or products? In what sense do they condition sociology or furnish it background and basis?

WE may begin by making further use of Einstein's discussion of space in his Nottingham address, previously cited. After Newton had established space as a separate thing, he tells us, the next great stage in development did not appear until Maxwell formulated his electro-magnetic equations. These seemed to require the introduction of a new basic "thing," namely ether, having a behaviour different from that of the space of matter. When special relativity appeared, space and time were consolidated into one "thing," space-time, the four-dimensional continuum. Ether now gradually became unnecessary and tended to be dropped from the list of "things." With the interpretation of gravitation in space-time under general relativity, and with Einstein's efforts, and the many others that are being made, to establish a general "field-theory" to incorporate not only electro-magnetic phenomena but also corpuscular phenomena, it is Einstein's expectation, his "pious hope," that space-time will survive as the sole "thing" of physics.

WHAT we have to take into account is not any specific feature of this development, nor any specific future change in it which may appear, but the significance which any such development whatever has for sociological investigation. We are shown first the old space-matter-thing, then a certain not-space-matter-thing, which seemed necessary in addition and finally the space-time thing which has consolidated part of the materials and which, it is hoped may consolidate all of them.²²

²²To appraise them we must remember to take the realism out of Einstein's term "thing," and consider it as a systemic specification within knowledge, always with the possibility that what is "thing" from one point of attack may prove to be operation from some other point of attack: so that the space-time construction may be an operative factor, without affecting its scientific value: just as Cartesian co-ordinates, set up by DesCartes as relational exhibits, and treated by Einstein as factual specifications, may themselves in the end appear as operational symbols in full linguistic knowledge.

These are shown to us in course of construction, evolution, discovery—however one may prefer to describe it—in knowledge and society. Their evolution is in mathematical patterns. They are not holding to any control by the prevalent vulgar space with its factual externalisation of Newtonian origin, and with its recognitional psychology. They involve intricate psychological or psychological-type problems of their own. Construction, externalisation and recognition are all involved together within them. They are not fly-by-nights of knowledge: but are instead of the most fundamental reference and importance. Their psychological intricacy cannot be brushed away by any dictum of old dogma. Nevertheless their psychological aspects are not being handled by the psychologists, and we may even be justified in suspecting that the present psychological science as a development of the Newtonian era is not capable of handling them. Nor are these problems being handled by the physicists who have their own work to do. Nevertheless the presence of the problems is open, it cannot be denied, and in the end they must be seriously faced. All of this is to say that the current physical spaces are constructions and problems within knowledge. To call them “abstract” in some sense not so “abstract” as mathematical spaces, but more “abstract” than vulgar space, does not settle the problem by any means: it merely labels it.

SUPPOSE, now, that in the development of observation and experiment some one, or possibly more than one, of the physical spaces is accepted as a standard construction for physics over a longer or shorter period of time: a period, let us say, long enough so that young men grow up into it, and do not witness signs of deterioration or destruction within it during their working lives. Will such a space, perhaps conventionally externalised and accompanied by a new specimen of vulgar space, furnish the positive and inevitable world-form under which a sociology must be constructed?

THE answer must be two-directioned as all general expressions of so wide a nature should be. Dogmatically such a physical construction cannot be the unquestioned basis for sociology, since it will be a form of knowledge, and that knowledge will be itself a social development: and the province of the sociology will include all of the social. But, on the other hand, it may prove to be so richly a form of construction for the social, that it will be entitled to appear as basic in all sociological construction. Just at the present day, if there is a direct method of valuing the existing experimental physical space-constructions, and of applying them with certain fertility to sociological construction, I am not aware of it.

THE indirect import of the present transitional stage for sociology is, however, very great. Physics has definitely rejected the prevalent

vulgar space, so far as the latter may make claim to dominate physical construction. Truer it would be to say, of course, that however much this present vulgar space may have seemed to be the actuality behind Newtonian physical space, it never influenced the latter at all, but that the influencing was in fact entirely the other way around. It can hardly be urged, if this is true, that the new physical spaces will ever be "externalised" into the pattern of the present vulgar space. We are therefore set free by the new developments of physics from any sense of compulsion to take over the Newtonian frame as our necessary sociological frame: and we are given incentive as sociologists to work out our own salvation by the study of all space forms, whether externalised or internal to the society, whether of Newtonian or of other derivation.

THE two following sections of this paper will discuss, first the factuality of the immediate presentation of social space, and then the manner in which mathematics can furnish models and aids for the sociological formulation of such factual social space. The one requirement for both of these branches of discussion is that we force ourselves to honest and thorough analysis of what our meaning is when we describe any of those phenomena which we call social—an organised institution, a language form, a law, a convention, a creed—in terms of direct fact and as itself a "thing" before our examination. The need of clarity here is all-pervasive in sociological investigation. It is just as vital when we speak of a social environment to a person, as when we speak of society as itself a subject, or as itself our subject-matter. Without this clarity, our foundations are throughout confusion.

[To be continued.]

RURAL SOCIOLOGY: A CHALLENGE OF THE TIMES: by Richard Kaysenbrecht.

I. THE PRESENT OUTLOOK IN RELATION TO ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL LIFE.

To the man who has lived through the third decade of this century—the decade of the settlement after the world war—conscious of all the vital changes in progress, it must have become increasingly plain that the world-war, the greatest disaster in the history of the world, was merely a necessary product of the world-outlook developed by the 19th century. The world-crisis that has shaken the structure of international economics at the end of this third decade even more violently than did the world-war, and has had powerful and widespread effects on a growing number of human activities, is merely one painful consequence of that world-disaster.

WHEN individualism, after centuries of struggle, prevailed among the Western races and celebrated its first triumph after the French Revolution—when this intellectual and political Individualism (which is French in origin) perfected by the English economic Individualism of Free Trade and the Manchester School, diffused itself victoriously over the European continent—the organic outlook on the world and on economics received a shattering blow. All values lost stability; subjective and relative ideas were spread abroad. Normal egotistical private interests took the place of universal ideas. The ruling spirit was dethroned by money, hitherto the servant. Social solidarity in town and country, which was of natural growth, dissolved itself into circles bound together by mutual interests, into social layers, castes and classes.

WHILE the ambitious exact sciences placed their ideas at the service of these new views by developing the technique and increasing the tempo of economic life (and thereby hastened urbanisation and as a result industrialisation, commercialisation and bureaucracy), cultural and intellectual science threw off its responsibility for the spiritual leadership of the century, by boasting of its lack of foresight—in view of the growing subjectivism and relativism—and finally declared itself of no value. Subjectivism and relativism in life, teaching and research, led to the development of many schools of intellectual and scientific thought. Their advocates hardly got beyond Plato in the interpretation of the character and purpose of this world. However they expounded a great deal in such a way that the general incomprehensibility of the situation was increased. These schools and their advocates built their ideas into towers of Babel which were often seen clearly by only one person—the one who built them. The London International Philosophical Congress and the Wiesbaden Teachers' Congress in 1930 revealed this babel-hubbub.

EVEN in the more practical fields things are much the same. After the Berlin National economist and sociologist Werner Sombart had been hailed as a leader during several decades, nearly all the professors of social science in Central Europe felt themselves compelled to assail him polemically when his *SPIRITUAL WILL* was published. Even his standard work *MODERN CAPITALISM* was put down as a literary work.

WHEN science, deprived of foresight and without sense of values, threw over responsibility, or at least was not able to take on a fully authoritative leadership, other intellectual forces stepped in.

THE press, pedagogy and politics—the three great educational forces of the modern cultural state, became more and more dependent on the wealth gathered in the great towns, to the owners of which pleasure was the first principle and the last purpose of life. In this way individual egotism in its various forms tends to disintegrate more and more the sound members and groups of society and their functions.

THE world-war—the last result of individualistic capitalism and triumphant materialism—destroyed the 19th century structure of world economics and the 19th century foundations of society. A few great world imperialisms have taken the place of many competing national imperialisms. In the former egotism has become more ruthless and scornful and applies its principles with fewer scruples than was the case with the latter.

AT the end of the 3rd decade of the 20th century nearly all fields of culture are permeated by the spirit of individualism and therefore have nearly all been drawn into the world crisis. Against this tendency the influence of other ideas and attempts at social reforms are of no avail.

THE crisis in science was followed by a crisis in commerce, out of which grew political conflict and the great catastrophe. The commercial (economic) crisis was followed by a legal crisis. From these conditions there is arising a great social crisis finding special expression in the mutually destructive political crisis. All this, and not least the chaos in Art, reveal the existence of a critical situation in our whole culture.

II. THE ULTIMATE QUESTION—THE FIRST PROBLEM OF SCIENCE.

WHILE still latent, this Western crisis had long been intuitively anticipated by sensitive men. Spengler's *DECAY OF THE WEST* was written in outline before the war. Events have hardly controverted, up to the present time, what he saw and prophesied, and have confirmed much of it. His idea of world-history, originally smiled at by cor-

porate science, and to-day still refused credence by academic historians, is now recognised by leading philosophers of culture and taken seriously, in its main characteristics, by many sociologists.

SUCH a historical philosophy is no longer merely an opportunity for dialectics. Its recognition is a necessity of the times, if the crisis is not to become a racial catastrophe. Within two or three generations certain aberrations of thought and feeling have developed in a menacing manner into physical injuries. A doubt as to the meaning of life—the self-satisfied shams and egotism of the few and of the many—have seriously weakened the will to live of just those who follow after the new tendencies of civilisation. The vices and sufferings of this new civilisation have exhausted the life power of the great mass of the people. The failing will to life expresses itself in the doubling of the number of divorces, in the greatly increased numbers of suicides, but most of all in the decline in births.¹

EVEN if the relations between births and deaths in Germany in the third decade are maintained (of which unfortunately there is no guarantee), there must assuredly be some decrease of the German population from about the middle of the century. There is little probability of the death figures improving. The doubling of the average duration of life since 1870 is an illusion, produced by a decrease in infant mortality. History has not yet shown that the birth figures have ever improved when the systematic limitation of families has taken place. On the contrary, all measures against masogamy and celibacy, all subsidies and rewards for large families, have shown themselves to be completely useless in cases where physical weariness of life has been followed by physical incapacity and sterility.

THE only escape from the increasing severity of the economic, social, political and cultural crises and from final national decay lies in the long run (as Privy Councillor Professor Dr. Falcke showed in his rectorial address at Leipsic in 1929) in the peasant class.

THE peasant, with his roots in nature, has striven with healthy instinct against the new views. He was afraid of "the salts" recommended to him by the artificial fertiliser trade; he fought against the artificial forcing of fodder plants, against the products of machinery and retorts. Later it was seen by all how sick the soils had become, how the plants grown on them had become subject to disease, how breeds quickly degenerated, how frequently animals fed on artificially grown products were subject to sterility and disease, how people fed on forced products become sickly.

WHEN these symptoms of disease and crisis, surprising and incomprehensible to most people, but expected by experts, showed themselves

¹F. Burgdörfer, *FAMILIE UND VOLK*. 1930.

in increasing measure, it was felt that general medical attention was needed. As, however, is well known in medicine, general medical attention to symptoms only leads to temporary improvement; constitutional therapy alone leads to lasting health. So is it also in the science of agriculture and rural practice. The better way was soon discovered. Against the universal hubbub about artificial manure and concentrated fodder arose the movement for green land, which aims at providing agriculture with more natural manure, cattle with natural fodder, and through both of these supplying the nation once more with healthy vitamin-rich nourishment. There is also a healthy basis in the "biological-dynamic" agricultural method.²

III. PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS OF A RURAL SOCIOLOGY.

THESE attempts at healing may lead to the renewed health of the foundations of society. The gradual decay of the national constitution through the decline in births can, however, only be stopped by the healing of the whole of the diseased organism. The cause of this lack of health in the social organism has always and everywhere been, as it now is in the 20th century, the unorganic development of town and country. The problem can only be solved in its entirety, and permanently, when endeavours are made to check and prevent this unorganic development. The possibility of doing this lies solely in a general moderating of tempo and technique in economics and in life, in an organic limitation of urbanisation, in lowering the excessive urban gains, and in raising the depressed agricultural profits. For *one* nation or *one* group of states this in the last resort means the surrender of ability to compete internationally, political concessions, and self-restraint in civilisation.

If from the social crises, from the conflict between town and country, between rural and industrial states, healthy social organisms are again to arise, then these associations must be examined and dealt with politically and culturally from an international point of view.³

WESTERN society is diseased. It has become diseased in spite of the fact that for over two thousand years social science has been known to us and that for over one hundred years we have had a "Sociology." German sociology has for the last three decades tenaciously and successfully struggled with almost all the academic faculties in its mission of getting its object and its methods recognised. The seventh German Sociological Congress in September, 1930, again bore witness to this fact.

²See GÄA-SOPHIA, Vol. II. Basel. 1929.

³See my WHY IS CO-OPERATION IN EUROPEAN AGRICULTURE NECESSARY? Paris. 1928. Europ: Wirtschafts-Union, Hague. 1928. No. 15/16.

WHILE, however, in the U.S.A. and in England for just as long a period a separation of urban and rural sociology has obtained, in Germany and on the Continent generally rural sociology is lacking.

IN proportion as the efforts of rural policy are without result—not only because they (and this is true of most European countries) are divided into so many camps, but also because Industry and Trade cultivate an increasingly international economic policy and thereby often neglect national considerations—so the mission and the prospects of rural sociology become more important. This sociology is not only designed to clear and level the way for a healthy rural policy, but also to establish other sociological doctrines on a healthy foundation, to build up methods and to bring to a fruitful result practical work in sociology.

THE rather one-sided scientifically taught intellectual German sociology has up to now behaved as though society were something eternally unalterable, as though it swayed through empty space like a purely intellectual image. For that reason many sociologists have hardly perceived how seriously society has become diseased in its various forms and functions, and that the very existence of the social body in Germany is seriously threatened after 1950.

IF we wish to be able to grasp the idea of society and its life as a whole with its various forms and functions, with its existing relationships and the proper association of all its members and groups, then we must understand society—in spite of all relativity—as a world of reality.

LIFE is movement and where no life is, death supervenes. Moving reality is the sum—better, the integration—of the most various effects which are called forth by forces. Without its forces moving and being set in motion life is extinct, the world is dead, and with it society.

BUT if we wish to understand fully and completely the existence and effects of all forces which make themselves felt in society; the cosmic, the physical and chemical, the physiological and psychological, eugenic and social forces, which bring about, maintain, change, build, and destroy the functions of the social organism and its forms, then we must be quite clear about the real foundations and effective associations in the microcosm and in the macrocosm, about the world from the atom to the League of Nations.

IF sociology is to be more than a mere play of words, it can only be carried on fruitfully and be made permanently successful by those who have consciously ranged themselves on the side of natural and cultural science and who are at home in philosophy and history, in physiology and psychology, in biology and anthropology, in law and science, in art and culture.

A HEALTHY society is only permanently possible as a social organism; such a one rests in all its forms and organs, its members and groups only on sound functioning. This, however, is linked with the right association of the members and organs with one another, and with the whole. That which is to be properly built together must therefore first be properly observed together. Sociology if it is to be taken seriously cannot be carried on by induction and deduction alone. The sociologist must be capable of inductive synopsis and of constructive synthesis.

A SYNOPSIS of what society really is, and a synthesis of what a healthy society should be, together with a productive method in sociology, can hardly be more fruitfully worked out than on a rural population. Here has been preserved a fundamental community in the sense given by the Nestor of German sociology, Ferdinand Tönnies.⁴ With this as object all effective forces—the physical and psychic, the cosmic and cultural, with their functions and the forms affected, the whole of the society and its various organs—can be easily dissected and brought together for observation.

IV. FORERUNNERS OF RURAL SOCIOLOGY.

EVEN some decades ago there were not lacking attempts to penetrate into the whole range of problems of the rural areas. No sociologist who takes the sociology of the countryside seriously can pass by the sociology of the Peasant War of 1519-25, the sources and archives of which have been collected in Bonn and Leipsic, and especially in the *ACTA TIROLENSIA*. In the beginning of the 18th century, the peasant question took on a sociological character. It was dealt with sociologically by an unknown author in Leipsic in 1711 in a pamphlet *THE FORTUNATE AND UNFORTUNATE PEASANTRY AND ITS ORIGIN, GROWTH AND CONSEQUENT DECLINE*.

FROM the 19th century, the works of George Frederick Knapp, especially his standard work, in two parts, *THE LIBERATION OF THE PEASANTRY AND THE ORIGIN OF THE AGRICULTURAL LABOURER*⁵ (1887), must be mentioned. At the end of the century the rural crisis awoke the interest of social-economists. Max Sering published in 1893 his researches on internal COLONISATION IN EASTERN GERMANY and in 1899 *THE HEREDITARY TRANSMISSION OF LANDED PROPERTY IN RURAL AREAS IN THE KINGDOM OF PRUSSIA*. In his important work of 1896, *CO-OPERATIVE COLONISATION*⁶ (an attempt to prevail over Communism by solving the co-operative problem and the rural question), Franz Oppenheimer went to the root of the sociological

⁴ *COMMUNITY AND SOCIETY*. 1887-1912.

⁵ By the new edition of which in 1927 the publishers Duncker and Humblot have deserved our gratitude.

⁶ *DIE SIEDLUNGSGENOSSENSCHAFT*.

problem of the scarcity of land and the proletarianising of the towns, but pointed far beyond the possibilities of the times, even of the new setting of 1922, in the inferences founded on his central idea.

MANY other works by national economists and administrative historians are lacking, however, in the necessary depth and grasp of the problems. It is essential, if such presentations are to have a general application, that the basic relations in moral life should be brought to light and dealt with scientifically.

V. BY WHOM AND HOW RURAL SOCIOLOGY SHOULD BE STUDIED.

It was probably with this idea that the Institute for Rural and Village life was founded by the Imperial Government. The works of C. von Dietze on the condition of Eastern agricultural labourers, and those of the Institute of Research on the Western hired rural labourer are further steps in this direction.

How rural sociological research must be carried out qualitatively, L. von Wiese has shown in his book *THE VILLAGE AS A SOCIOLOGICAL STRUCTURE*, 1928. But it must be pointed out that it is hardly possible for youthful students of political science who are strangers to country life to obtain and publish an exhaustive sociological picture after one week of study. The peasants of the Hunsrück are, moreover, not an "Ideal type" of the German peasantry.

THE man most capable of developing into a rural sociologist is one who is himself of country origin, but who has become acquainted with the habits of thought and action of both provincial and capital cities, though not necessarily through professional experience. For him land-hunger is an experience which attracts him to a synoptic observation of that problem through all times and regions. For him urbanisation and unemployment, depopulation of the countryside, and rural crises become the vital questions of a people, the root problems of a whole culture. For such a rural-sociologist, humanity in town and country is no artificial product to be treated as a visionary item; the real pulsing life is there, only to be seized by sympathetic observation of the manysidedness of its forms and functions.

WHILE such sociology lays hold inductively of these forms (e.g., farmhouse, land-girls, young peasants, domestic servants, agricultural labourers, village, parish, estate management, peasant union, co-operatives, "latifundian" ownership, colonisation), it must also, where special trained workers are lacking, be capable of using special disciplines, with their methods and results. The rural-sociologist must, for instance, study religious foundations in order to understand the rise of the mennonite Black Sea German peasants or the development of the Belgian Peasants' Union; he must be absorbed in the caste

systems of India in order to understand the generation-long responsibility of the Rajats ; he must become acquainted with Lao-tsés Tao-te-king in order to understand the Chinese peasantry. He must be a schoolmaster to follow the building up of the Danish co-operative system from the People's High School movement. Only through the history of culture is it possible to explain and sociologically appraise Spanish rural conditions, the Hungarian county organisation, the Russian Mir and Feldgemeinschaft.

WHILE deductively following up the development in time of the various forms of rural communities, the student recognises the forces acting in them and by them and thus learns to understand their functions. By local examination of the forms and functions or (in the words of L. von Wiese) of the structures and connections of society as a whole and of its members one can compare the systems, and find out how and why the various social forces have developed in this way or that.

RURAL history and rural statistics in this way become essential foundations of rural sociography : i.e., of a scientific picture of rural society.

FROM an examination over a period of time, especially in an international framework, one may from the sociographical forms and relations eventually recognise certain laws of the functions and forces of society. From these may be built up in rural sociology a socionomy or science of laws relating to rural society, its movements, its culture, and its changes.

FROM this method of observation the influences of the urban and political society on the rural community will be clear. To the astonishment of the rural sociological research student many old peasant precepts will reveal noticeable agreement with the new discoveries of exact science. In proverbs and in rural speech the sociologist, working on the broad basis already indicated, will find the newest achievements of modern times noted as ancient and generally-known philosophies. What, for instance, the latest Nobel prize-winner, Landsberg, worked out laboriously in his blood-theory by scientific means, had already been expressed generally in the acceptance of four temperaments, in " Birds of a feather flock together." To the peasant the world was never anything but " Reality," the sum of God's expression of power, which science for centuries has been adding up, but has not yet explained.

THE more the social-economists lose themselves in theoretical systems of political economy, the more are ideas divided as to what political economy is. To the peasant it has always been and still remains *Husbandry*. From the point of view of the rural-sociologist the right aspect is only gained when one sees how greatly economics and

science have failed to prevent that pure life-filled existence from becoming an empty appearance. Only when it is seen how the declining birth-rate results from urban unemployment with increasingly acute economic crises on the one hand, and from the rural crises aggravated by unemployment on the other hand, can an insight be gained into the whole of economic policy, of trade and finance policy, of social and cultural policy. From this point of view can be generally and comprehensively reviewed the social and cultural meaning of modern technique, the mechanising and the mobilising of economic life, of motors and wireless, of the 48-hour week, and of the homestead-movement, of the curriculum of the elementary and secondary schools, of canals and motor-roads, of the housing question and of the "latifundian" problem.

WHILE one is forming a sociological picture from Babel to Berlin,⁷ it will be recognised that all action and effect in the world's history is, in the last resort, grounded on two philosophical principles and political aspirations: Individualism and Universalism, selfishness and solidarity, hunger and love. Voluntary society and fundamental community, country folk and town folk, are the last sociological expressions of these two main social forces. All other forms, down to political majorities and minorities, are derived from them and are traceable to them.

PURE and general science cannot remain an end in itself in a cultural crisis. A poverty-stricken people can hardly take pleasure in "research" as their truest luxury. The object of all true science when investigation is made is: What is and why is it so? and also to say: What is to be done? In saying this there is no intention of attacking the much-lauded want of hypothesis or value in science. It is, in sociology, especially necessary to say however, as Pesch in his *TEXTBOOK ON NATIONAL ECONOMICS* and Oppenheimer in his *SYSTEM OF SOCIOLOGY* have logically worked out, what is to be done from a social scientific and social economic point of view—not what is to be done from an ethical, religious or metaphysical point of view. The logical method is already well grounded in the dispassionate idea of the real world as the sum of the effects of a certain state and a certain tendency. "The causality encloses a finality; the driving cause, an object and an aim within itself. A science which is to be taken seriously must therefore contain the investigation of the causality *and* the finality, of the existence and the being."

If a man investigates the forms and functions of a rural folk as a whole in pure or general rural sociology, its economic, co-operative, professional, political, social and cultural members and groups, its

⁷ See the author's "Unorganic Development of town and country," in the papers of the IV. CONGRÈS INTERNATIONAL POUR L'EMBELLISSEMENT DE LA VIE RURALE. Liege, 1930.

situation in regard to its members and as a whole, together with its connections with (and effects on the various fields of culture in) the other, the urban society ; if he recognises through social-historical synopsis how and why the different social forces have so acted ; if international synopsis reveals the fact and the reason why the various forms and functions of society have given rise to more or less true, or more or less false conditions which hinder the functions important for life ; then it becomes the mission of applied rural sociology to show by clear-sighted synthesis where sociologically correct relationships forms and functions can exist within the rural area, and its connections with the rest of society, where it must exist, if the existence of the whole of society as a sociological structure is not to be endangered.

IN this way applied rural sociology becomes a sound basis for rural policy. Applied rural sociology is nothing else than rural politics as a science. Its conduct, rural politics as an art, remains then only political tactics.

THE quicker the economic progress, the greater the speed of the machinery of the law, the more necessary it becomes for the parliamentarian, for the politician, and for the teacher to have unexceptional, sociological supports. A few books on agricultural politics, a few scattered and in some degree tendentious essays in magazines, an occasional newspaper article, are not enough to offer comprehensive support for an authoritative treatment of the problems of economics and of the lives of the people.

MUNZINGER'S utterances on the Württemberg Peasant have shown how definite and desirable a sociological view of rural conditions is. One cannot take up such questions as purely economic ; only the sociological method of viewing them makes the right conclusions possible.

How fruitful the sociological method of treatment of rural folk is can be seen from the development of the Danish People's High Schools and Co-operative Societies. And from the Danish peasantry in general : and further from the development of the Swiss Peasant Union, which has brought Dr. Laur the fame of a " Peasant Doctor " ; and not least the development of the Belgian Peasant Union, which has given Flemish economics and culture an impulse that is admired beyond the borders of Belgium.

IF the population crisis is not to be felt from 1950 onwards to a terrifying extent, then understanding of the questions mentioned here^{*} must be brought within the range of national and economic circles which have regarded or still regard this problem of German culture and German national life as would strangers, without understanding or sympathy.

^{*}An extended description is in hand.

IN the catalogues of the non-agricultural libraries, in the dictionaries, in political and political science handbooks, in museums and schools, in literary representations of organised art, rural folk hardly appear, or if they do, then it is rather as the object than as the subject. If this continues the peasant will sink into a state of having no history.

RURAL sociology must and will here make a change. Both in general and in applied sociology there are numberless points of contact with sciences which have similar aims. In politics and statistics Burgdörfer has become a focus of interest, a programme of strivings, as has also Grotjahn in medicine and social hygiene, as have Paul Rohrbach and Hans Harmsen in population politics. In the same way the eugenicist Muckermann works. In history Breysig makes the claim of having set up stages and laws of world development long before Spengler.

As a philosopher and teacher Edmund Spranger in the Frederick Session of the Prussian Academy of Science published his culture cycle theory in January, 1926. He declared that the fact that cohesion cannot be perceived by an organically built up science signifies a culture crisis. Culture is already threatened, when the representatives of culture, that is to say the people, will not represent it any longer, still more so when they *cannot* represent it any longer. With every decrease in population must be combined a decay of culture.

As amongst the different studies of science there are many points of contact, possibilities of results and co-operative action, so also, quite apart from politics, there are between sociology, pedagogy, and the press.

IN the exact sciences the press gives great assistance by quick publication and popularising of research and progress. In a cultural crisis this may lead to the spiritual sciences simply following with a limp; technique makes the running for life and economics. The cultural sciences and politics can only to some extent act as brakes on the wheels of developments often unfortunate. They have to limit themselves to healing the damage caused. Not this, however, but prevention, must be made the aim and object of the cultural sciences, must be the deciding factor in their policy. So long as politics remains the "Art of the Possible" the damage to society and administration must become more and more severe, the healthy reaction be more and more checked. If, however, sociology becomes the forum of the cultural sciences, as Tönnies when President of the Seventh German Sociological Meeting advised, then politics can become the "Art of the Necessary." Intellect will again lead before money, humanity will keep its right to exist and its dignity as such, in spite of the machine; and the destruction of communities and the separation of groups and members of society will be checked. This will not be possible without the full collaboration of the press.

IN the same way that politics and the press are the last leaders and educators of the spirit of humanity and of public opinion, so pedagogy and the parental roof are the first educators and therefore the most influential leaders of society.

FROM my own observation, I found before the war that the introduction of folk-lore and local government into Elementary and Secondary schools (into the framework of which rural sociology was to be worked) left much to be desired. A responsible ministerial official assured me that at the end of the third decade of this century things are no better. The text-books and manuals of folk-lore and local government are in the view of the teacher too far removed from reality and life.

ALSO in the continuation schools this question must be taken more in earnest. More necessary than the introduction of the urban social and economic system in the rural continuation schools is that of the sociological problems of the rural areas in the urban continuation and technical schools, with the special proviso that this is a life and death question for the German race. To every town dweller it must be quite clear always and everywhere and remain so, that he, the townsman, not only lives by the bread but also by the blood of the countryside : that the town not only draws the best brains and muscles from the rural areas, but that the rural areas bear the cost of training them, while the town harvests the fruits of this training and cultivation.

THEN through rural sociology, as half of special sociology, general social science would find a healthy basis on which questions of sociological subjects and sociological methods should be rapidly answered ; then through rural sociology real "folk-communion" could be investigated and helped. Rural sociology would be a bridge between political science and culture philosophy.

THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF SOCIOLOGY.

THE President of the Institute of Sociology (Professor Patrick Geddes) has recently suggested to the Council of the Institute that means should be found for establishing closer contacts with the sociological movement in other countries. While this suggestion is under discussion it may be appropriate to give readers of the REVIEW the most recent news of the International Institute of Sociology. The two papers printed below have been selected and translated for that purpose. It will be seen that in recent years the work of the International Institute has developed along fresh lines: its programme for the future is also of outstanding interest. It may be hoped that British Sociologists will be able to take some share in carrying out that programme.

I. THE TENTH CONGRESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF SOCIOLOGY (GENEVA, 1930).*

THE International Institute of Sociology held its triennial Congress at Geneva from October 12—17, 1930. This Congress gave evidence of the re-establishment of the Institute, and further made it possible to plan and inaugurate a change which will certainly be a most happy one. The Congress held at Paris in 1927 (after the death of René Worms) was unable to do anything more than bring together the members of the Institute whom the war and its consequences had separated or ranged on opposite sides. An appeal had been directed to the sociologists of those nations which the war had cut off from the Headquarters as well as to those of the allied or neutral nations. In 1930, however, the Congress was frankly international in character. Germany was brilliantly represented and showed herself in sympathy with the work. Like Austria, she returns to the Institute with a brilliant group of men of the first rank.

THE preparations for the Congress had been shared with the General Secretary, by President Mariano Cornejo, member for some time of the Council of the League of Nations, and by Vice-President Duprat (now the General Secretary), and had been assisted by the powerful and active Sociological Society of Geneva, and its delegation composed of Mlle. Jeanne Duprat and Messieurs Derobert and André de Maday. This assistance, like that given by the Sociological Society of Paris three years earlier, was a clear demonstration of the rôle assigned to societies of sociology in an international Institute such as ours, as decided by the amendment of the first article of our statutes. A consequence of this change was that three large societies at once sought affiliation: the society of Geneva, the Masaryk Society of Czecho-Slovakia, and the Society of Zagreb (Jugo-Slavia).

WE have promises from many others. From now on the international Institute of Sociology aims at providing a channel of communication between unfettered centres of research and discussion, already established or in course of formation throughout the whole of the civilised world. Individual membership, we venture to think, will not disappear on that account, but the sociological idea necessarily demands stabilised groupings.

THE atmosphere of the Congress was one of warm sympathy, and interest in the proceedings was from the beginning to the end not only sustained, but increasing. The Swiss Council of State, the Administrative Council of the town of Geneva, and the Rectors of the Universities of Geneva and

*Translated by Miss D. Harvey from the *REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE SOCIOLOGIE* I. and II. 1931.

Lausanne all showed us the greatest kindness: this, in spite of the fact that Geneva is a town where Congresses succeed one another incessantly throughout each year. After the animated and sometimes excited meetings, the members of the Congress were invited to brilliant receptions by the Council of State and the town of Geneva, by the Sociological Society, and by the acting President of the Institute—M. Mariano Cornejo. At the opening meeting we had the honour of the company of M. Malche, Minister for Public Instruction, who in his speech showed himself well versed in the problems and methods of sociology; of M. Legrand, the French Consul; of M. Johnston, delegate of the International Labour Office; and of M. Jourdan, delegate of the Committee for Intellectual Co-operation.

THE programme of the Congress comprised an investigation on the one hand into the underlying causes of wars and, on the other, into the conditions of a lasting peace.

THERE was no question of the legitimacy of such an investigation. As we made clear in the report read at the opening meeting, sociologists could not renounce the study of such a question as this (which is fundamentally that of the rupture of social bonds and of the reality of the facts of international life) without denying the whole history of their science. Auguste Comte and Herbert Spencer, especially the latter, summed up sociology as the antithesis between military and industrial society; the former corresponding to the past, to simple social relations, to the part played by force in the organisation of co-operation, and the latter to a complicated division of labour between nations as well as individuals, and to a preponderance of contractual and voluntary co-operation over the old forms of forced co-operation. According to Comte, the complete and final elimination of militarism was the imposing task that faced the religion of humanity. As for Spencer, he awaited the working out of a new constitution for the State which, by slow differentiation, would bring about the administration of civil justice under the pressure of a public opinion enlightened as to the true tendencies of life in society. These conflicting doctrines and the rude frustration of the highest hopes of the first sociologists which events up to the present have brought about, brought into prominence the opposing theories of Gumplowicz and Ratzenhofer, who have sought to interpret in terms of natural selection the history of the State. Thus there has arisen an apotheosis of militarism to which should belong the future even more than the past by virtue of the inexorable law of "absolute hostility" (*Feindseligkeit*).

CONTEMPORARY sociologists have, however, every right to enquire whether this is indeed the last word of their science; whether henceforth their rôle will be practically to scoff at an ideal of peace, of universal and harmonious co-operation; or whether, with the increased resources of their science and precision of their method, their rôle should not rather consist in taking up again the problem set by Grotius at the beginning of the 17th century and by Kant at the end of the 18th—the problem whether Right is ultimately able to govern the relations of states, as it governs the relations of individuals, families and groups in the heart of the State itself. It is a question of ascertaining whether the modern state, looked at in itself, can behave like an honest collective person; or whether, by virtue of a fatality inherent in its origin and nature, it is a highway ruffian.

GROTIUS, in spite of the clear conception he formed of the connexion between right and human fellowship, and Kant, in spite of his synthetic views on "a universal history from a cosmopolitan point of view," have been very

often represented as absolutist minds of whom a sociology of greater relativity need no longer take account. At a very recent date, however, we have seen an evolutionary sociologist like Hobhouse affirm categorically that there is a fundamental agreement between the "inductions" of sociology and comparative psychology and the principles of Grotius. Moreover, a great psychologist who re-adopted the methods of sociology towards the end of his life, F. W. Jerusalem, restored, on the basis of historical relativity itself, the practical philosophy of Kant, and confirmed its hopes of peace. According to him, indeed, the State develops rather through the consciousness of individuals than territorially. Each individual receives from it an education which, within the limits of national life, prepares him for peace and respect for law. Wherefore, then, should the State subject itself to perpetual war at the risk of seeing its moral and social efforts periodically destroyed?

THE programme of the Congress included 19 papers or written communications, one in Spanish, two in English, the rest in French. The authors were Messieurs Rafael Altamira, Barnes, Bernard, Boutboul, Castrilli, Cornejo, Derobert, Eylaud, G. L. Duprat, Jeanne Duprat, Kozlowski, Lasbax, André de Maday, Amerigo Namias, Raoul Orgaz, Paul Otlet, Péritch, Gaston Richard. In addition there was a collective communication from the Sociological Society of Geneva, for which Messieurs Derobert, de Maday, Fauquet, Tendary and Kuttig were chiefly responsible.

MOST of these papers, as might be expected of sociologists more concerned with explanation and prediction than with action, dealt with the underlying causes of war (not to say natural causes) rather than with the conditions for a lasting peace. As Mr. Barnes showed in his concise and thoughtful paper, in order to secure peace one must eliminate the causes of war and consequently catalogue them and weigh their strength. However, the reasons—also of rather fundamental character—for looking for a lasting condition of peace in the present state of the world were set out by President Mariano Cornejo with ardent eloquence.

THE papers concerned with elucidating the causes of war were at variance on a point of supreme importance, namely, whether these causes are inevitable, or whether, at any rate in time, they may be eliminated by the deliberate effort of man. The majority of the papers took this latter view. Let us mention those of M. Rafael Altamira, the great historian of Spanish society, at present Judge at the International Court of the Hague, of Harry Elmer Barnes, Raoul Orgaz, Lesbax, Péritch and Kozlowski, of Mlle. Jeanne Duprat, and of Messieurs Derobert and André de Maday, of M. Paul Otlet of Brussels, and our own.

THE contrary view found an eloquent, ardent and indefatigable advocate in M. Amerigo Namias, professor at the University of Rome and author of a documented study of *WAR AND THE SOUL OF NATIONS*. According to him, the prevision of a lasting peace founded on the indefinite persistence of particular conditions is incompatible with the natural laws of social life and the psychology of nations as we know them at the present day. M. G. L. Duprat lent him some support, though very limited and conditional.

ON the afternoons of Tuesday and Wednesday, October 13th and 14th, two meetings were given up to the discussion of these theories. The second one was presided over by M. Fehr, Rector of the University of Geneva. Besides the authors of papers (particularly M. Duprat who summarised the papers already read and the discussions that accompanied them) and Messieurs Boutboul and Eylaud, there took part Professor Leopold von Wiese,

the eminent sociologist of Cologne, M. Grandjean, Professor of Philosophy at Lausanne, M. Mitkovitch of the Faculty of Law at Geneva, M. Fauquet, Dr. Zbigniew of Lubinski, M. Chalupny of Prague, M. Rugarli, director of the *RIVISTA DE SOCIOLOGIA* and Secretary of the Italian Society of Sociology, and M. Roger Mauduit, whose recent theses on *AUGUSTE COMTE AND POLITICAL ECONOMY* and on *BALLANCHE* promise France a sociologist of high merit. Moreover, it can without exaggeration be said that at both meetings, especially the second, the discussion developed into a duel between Professor Amerigo Namias and Professor Emile Lasbax of the University of Clermont-Ferrand. Both of them had dealt with the difficult but most important question of the historical rhythm of peace and war in their papers. There is but a step from an interpretation of history to the forecasting if not the anticipation of the future. M. Namias believes the rhythm of peace and war to be ungovernable by the reason or by the will of man, owing to the late appearance of both in the course of evolution. M. Lasbax considers that war is a derived state and not a primitive one. He likens it to an organism that is born and gradually grows in the heart of societies, taking on different forms according to the social formation into which it is successively transplanted. The analysis of this rhythm leads him to distinguish three fundamental types: ethical wars, proceeding from a successive disturbance of religious, juridical and moral values; secondly, economic wars; and lastly, wars that are properly political. The study of this vital rhythm enables him to specify, not only the nature of the malady, but also that of the remedy. The "sociology of wars" becomes an "inter-social medicine" whose data can take a more and more scientific form, capable in consequence of leading to more and more certain remedies.

Two different political systems could be deduced from this conflict of theses, but as we interpret them they represent a particular conflict of two philosophies, of two conceptions of the relations between social science and the doctrine of evolution; that of Herbert Spencer, carried to its logical conclusion and that of M. Bergson.

IN the verbal survey that we had to make of the work of the Congress, we insisted that a distinction may legitimately be drawn between the possibility of future wars and their natural necessity. If, as a perception of the true conditions of every science demands, something is left to human liberty, even in the relations of the activity of our species with the laws of nature; if one refrains from confusing scientific determinism with natural fatality and with logical necessity;—it is incontestable that in the future a morally bad and unjust use could be made of this liberty. It is the same with war as with crime. Accordingly, the prediction of an unalterable everlasting peace fails to carry conviction. In the past (up to relatively recent dates) the unitary state and the federal state have been agitated and threatened with dissolution, if not actually dissolved, by civil wars and by wars of secession: this notwithstanding the existence of courts of justice, of diets, of legislative powers for settling social conflicts. Therefore even if the League of Nations, enlarged by the adherence of the United States and the Soviet Union, were to have a much stronger internal constitution than to-day, war would still be possible according to historical analogies.

BUT although this is possible, that does not imply that it is inevitable or that the reverse is impossible. The will to peace is just as possible as the will to injustice. Justice is as possible as homicidal violence. The peace-loving and peace-making institutions, already outlined, exercise an educational action on public opinion. This is comparable to the intensive effect which,

according to Jerusalem, the state exerts on the conscience of the citizen. In the course of ages to come, it is possible, even probable, that this conscience will gain in extent and intensity. Nothing ever resists public opinion. Each of the great nations, to-day homogeneous and harmonious, is the product of a slow and laborious pacification. In Great Britain, for centuries, Scotland and England engaged in implacable war of which scarcely the memory remains. It was the same in Italy, where nobody remembers the wars in which two neighbouring cities like Siena and Florence were set at each other's throats. Who can affirm that this integration has reached its limit with the constitution of the National States as these exist in the 19th and 20th centuries?

M. NAMIAS spoke of the collective fury and intoxication which at certain moments beset peoples and force the hand of governments. But M. Altamira, with his double qualification as historian and international magistrate, declared himself in a written communication distinctly opposed to this hypothesis, denying that there exists among peoples (as distinct from populaces) a positive will to war. In a remarkable impromptu speech, M. Boutboul brought evidence from contemporary history to the same effect, by showing what political difficulties the morrows of war can bring even to victorious governments. Popular insurrections are evidence of a misunderstood will to peace or of a delayed revenge for a policy of war imposed from on high.

It is true that in every nation a certain latent antipathy against other nations may exist, chiefly on account of differences in manners, tastes and character. Too often these antipathies are maintained and even inflamed by false education in patriotism. But in this there is nothing unchangeable. M. Roger Mauduit recalled concisely that what is natural is not on that account irresistible and inevitable, and that there exists a social art capable of modifying usefully the operation of irrational forces—if necessary—by setting natural laws against one another. If things are considered from this point of view, it may be said that the rhythm of peace and war is not more deadly than that of public health and epidemics, because epidemics also have natural causes.

WE can attempt no more than a brief description of the Congress and its discussions. A complete and faithful account will be given in a forthcoming volume of the *ANNALES DE L'INSTITUT INTERNATIONAL DE SOCIOLOGIE*. The study of the causes or demographic and economic conditions of wars was specially penetrating. The papers of Messieurs Boutboul and Dr. Eylaud will render it very difficult, I believe, to defend the Darwinian (or pseudo-Darwinian) theory which sees in war a means of social selection. Those of Mlle. Duprat and of Messieurs Derobert and de Maday will bear witness to the persistence at Geneva of the doctrines of her illustrious son, Sismondi, who did not separate applied economy from moral science.

AFTER the meetings were over the Congress had to decide upon a programme and place for its next assembly. It also had to appoint a staff that could maintain activity for three years. These two latter points gave rise to no difficulty. The Congress fixed Geneva as the usual seat of its triennial reunions, except when (as is probable) it receives an invitation from some affiliated society. After having elected the retiring Censor, M. Gide, and a retiring Vice-President, M. Posada, Honorary Members, and paid homage to the memory of a deceased Vice-President, Mgr. Deploige, the Congress elected as General Secretary M. G. L. Duprat, too well known to our readers for there to be any purpose in recalling his talents and qualifications; as Censor M. Emile Lasbax, Professor of Philosophy at the University of

Clermont-Ferrand ; as Vice-Presidents M. Mariano Cornejo, the retiring President, M. Leopold von Wiese, Editor of the Cologne QUARTERLY FOR SOCIOLOGY and Professor at the University of Cologne, and M. Paul Descamps, our eminent collaborator, whom the Portuguese University of Coimbra has just appointed to teach sociology there. The author of this article found himself raised to the presidency under conditions which did not allow of his declining the honour and the responsibility. He firmly intends to devote all his remaining strength to the service of this great task.

CHOOSING the programme was more difficult. Ought we to put to the Congress of 1933 but one question as a subject of discussion? Should that be chosen from the class of problems which interest pure sociologists, or from those that commend themselves to young people preoccupied mostly with practical affairs? A choice was possible between these two alternatives. After an exchange of arguments, the Congress decided to propose as the principal question "The conditions of Scientific Prevision in Sociology," and as subsidiary question, "The Human Habitat." We venture to recommend these problems to the attention and meditation, not only of our collaborators, but also of our readers.

GASTON RICHARD.

2. TOWARDS INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION IN SOCIOLOGY : by Professor G. L. Duprat.*

THERE is no task more urgent for sociologists than the eviction from our science of the divers "sociologisms" and the multiple "social philosophies" that bring us discredit in the eyes of true scientific workers. Reviews and libraries called "sociological" abound in articles and works that aim at spreading abroad "theories" and "ideas," independently of all methodological discipline. No one, however, will refuse to admit that a true science only exists on condition that it submits to the rules common to all established sciences, developed from hypotheses partly verified and indefinitely verifiable by experiment.

ONE cannot deny that a sociography which is as yet no more than a morphology, a classification of social types, is scientific in character: there are laws of co-existence to establish before passing on to the social physiology that alone is explicative, alone is capable of achieving the real task of science. Further, sociography should lead methodically to the search for essential characters, and to the objective elimination of the accidental, the particular, and the contingent. Simple documentation by monographs, without selections and inductive analysis, serves rather to encumber the memory than to develop a knowledge of the facts themselves. It cannot be repeated too often that this knowledge, which consists in the substitution of abstract concepts for concrete images, in the perception of realities behind ideas, begins where documentation leaves off. The legitimate and necessary reaction against the dialectic too much in favour in social philosophy, cannot go so far as to substitute unintelligent, almost passive, documentation for scientific ideas built up for objective concepts.

THE end of all science, however, is prevision as a result of interpretation: that is, a subjection of the anticipation of future happenings to the knowledge of constant relations. Statistics, which have known some remarkable

*Translated by Miss D. Harvey from an article in the *RIVISTA DI SOCIOLOGIA*. Anno V, Fc. 1.

successes in the physical sciences (where the determinism of probabilities within assignable limits has been substituted for the old "natural determinism"), have attempted to establish connexions, or better, correlations; but these also have the serious drawback of depending only very slightly upon a truly scientific understanding. The correspondence of two statistical curves can serve at the most to indicate a common dependence upon common but unknown factors, or a link to be investigated through a greater or less number of intermediaries: so long as no intelligible relation can be perceived between two series of phenomena that vary in apparent correspondence, nothing has yet been accomplished for sociology.

THE things that matter, therefore, are hypotheses on the co-existence in each type of characteristic traits, and on constant relations—of succession, of concomitant variations, and of "immediate" functions. The systematic mind, that is at home with every theory or doctrine, tends to leave on one side "adventurous" hypotheses, while the scientific mind leaves out none *a priori*, not even those that may suggest the most hoary doctrines (which gives its interest to the history of these doctrines). We merely ask that the hypothesis shall arise as the result of a preparation of the inventive powers conditioned for the greater part by the examination of facts, by inductive analysis; and that it can be submitted to verification under all circumstances, however diverse, in which the supposed connexion is capable of manifesting itself. And these legitimate requirements lead us to desire ardently for sociology an intellectual co-operation that is as fully developed and as widespread as possible.

No one has any illusion as to the objective value of historical and ethnographical data. Examination of the evidence without which there is no conjectural knowledge of the past or the distant, does not bring us reassurance. We have so many reasons for not believing in the complete intellectual probity of all sorts of authors of memoirs and so-called observers, that it is only with well-founded scepticism that we can make use of the historical, archeological and ethnological riches within our reach. What will remain, before long, of all the divergent interpretations of the testimony of explorers and missionaries concerning the "totem," "tabou," "intichiuma," "potlatch," &c.? In half a century, what will be the importance of the soundest "historical syntheses" developed in our time on the basis of the widest learning? We are indeed obliged to reap our harvest when we can for want of anything better; but the inheritance is doubtful, and its powers of enrichment suspect.

WE shall achieve the possession of satisfactory documents only in so far as we are able to compare data derived from all available sources. It should be possible to carry on sociological observation simultaneously in every part of the inhabited world; thousands of scientific missions are required to inform us fully as to the existence of a supposed constant relation of a supposed well-defined type. No isolated man, whatever his erudition, can make a positive sociology. Strictly speaking, the physicist, the chemist, the biologist can work alone in his laboratory and make discoveries for others to invalidate or confirm, which, in general, will have some scientific value; but the sociologist can only participate in a collective effort. More than any other science, sociology is an achievement to issue from the collective effort and intellect of successive generations of observers, analysts, and scientific visionaries. Millions will have to be spent in every civilised country in order to drag sociology out of the rut where she runs the risk of remaining along with traditional history, archæology, anthropology and ethnology.

Each university, each institute of social science, should have its thousands of students, investigators and observers, who should be able to envelop the collective life with a veritable network of disciplined intellects.

THIS does not mean that we have an unmerited disdain for the works of historians, anthropologists and ethnologists, who strive to remedy, so far as they are able, the relativity of their data. If, some day, history and ethnology are able to establish themselves on more solid foundations, nothing could be more advantageous for the sociologist than the confrontation of past and far-distant facts with present-day facts and those easy of observation, with a view to establishing types that are increasingly objective and relations whose constancy would be verified in time as in space. But it is just as necessary for sociology to furnish history and ethnology with sound hypotheses, under cover of which a more systematic criticism of the evidence and its interpretations may be made. And to arrive at these fruitful hypotheses, nothing is more urgent than the conscientious observation of present-day social phenomena on the largest possible scale. That is why we wish to begin by international co-operation in sociology: and this is possible, thanks to the many societies, institutes and universities now established for the scientific study of the facts and relations of collective life in every part of the world.

How is this co-operation to be organised ?

IN the present state of sociological co-operation workers are obliged to peruse reviews and books which, for the most part, are far from having the least importance and presuppose either well-furnished libraries or considerable personal expense. The congresses or periodical re-unions of sociologists are rarely of such a character as to allow any question to be seriously studied. A need is felt of organs for selecting and diffusing those ideas most worthy of being retained and of those facts best adapted for invalidating or confirming hypotheses.

IT is now thirty years since the writer of these lines began his uninterrupted collaboration with the *REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE SOCIOLOGIE*, in which he must have published hundreds of analyses of articles and books. He is justified in stating that 90 per cent. of his long labour has been pure loss; first because the works analysed were of too feeble a range; second because readers could hardly benefit at all from a too brief abstract, whose only function, in principle, is an invitation to read the complete text. Moreover, analyses if compared with one another are worth much less than more or less systematic reviews which demand a classification and preliminary selection of the scattered data. From this point of view, *SOCIAL SCIENCE ABSTRACTS*, directed by Professor Stuart Chapin, have met a need; perhaps, however, the field of investigation is too vast to be worked with a view only to the desiderata of sociologists; undoubtedly the *ABSTRACTS* would gain by selection, would gain more from a more rigorous selection; but the idea is excellent and a valuable working tool is henceforth in our hands. We all require prompt information as to the results of the efforts extending from America throughout the States of Europe and as far as Japan, which deserve our attention, but should not (with a few exceptions) engage it for long.

DIVISION of labour is necessary, as well as concentration, to provide for the re-distribution and diffusion of the results. Could not each review of sociology or similar organ adopt a plan for its analyses, abstracts and reviews of books and articles, which, after discussion, should be imposed on all as the most rational? Thus we should have fixed rubrics in methodology; general

sociology, demography and ecology, sociology of manners and of religions, sociology of groups and of social structures, political and legal sociology; economic, educational, pathological and criminological, æsthetic and linguistic sociology. Thus each student would know where to find without difficulty what more particularly interests him.

It would be convenient to adopt general rules for analysis and description; to eliminate repetition and recurrence to old doctrines or theories; to take account of the normative only so far as it deals with social experiments that have been or can be attempted, and the study of a procedure that has been or can be repeated; to eliminate all that is dialectical or simply descriptive and does not bear on the selective analysis of well-established facts; to demonstrate more especially types and relations apart from materials. What Frazer calls "the task of *Psyche*" ought to be the work of everyone attached to a sociological periodical.

A SPECIALISATION of periodicals is very desirable in view of the need for establishing and developing competent critical powers in each part of the field. Specialisation, however, requires an organ for distribution and co-ordination and especially for centralisation of the results obtained on divers points, hitherto unrelated. That is why the International Institute of Sociology proposes to all the adhering societies, which have become members in consequence of a recent modification of the statutes, the establishment of a centre of co-ordination and information at Geneva capable of putting groups and their particular organs into touch with one another. A periodical bulletin could be sent by the Secretary of the Institute to each of the societies to keep them informed regarding the activity of the whole—the problems in view, the investigations it is desired to undertake in such and such a country; information which most often can only be given by observers within reach of the chosen fields.

DOUBTLESS such an organ as the *AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY*, which has exceptional resources in investigators of every kind, is already capable of performing the function of intermediary between the sociologists of the New World; but it is not difficult to show that the *JOURNAL* is specially concerned with the study of questions arising in the United States (sociology of groups, of sects and parties, of immigration—ecology, social mobility—rural and urban sociology, &c.). All could profit by seeing to what extent the proposed generalisations are legitimate, given the different social structures of other nations. Each century and especially each type of civilisation stamps sociological research with its own imprint; yet scientific knowledge remains none the less one; and it is precisely by comparing the divers special points of view that one can best arrive at the greatest width of outlook, the broadest comprehension of phenomena, and the fullest notion of general types.

THE divergencies to-day come from the absence of a methodology established in common. International co-operation in sociology supposes preliminary discussions on the value and range of the processes of investigation and explanation. That is why we have put in the programme for the Congress of the International Institute of Sociology, in 1933, *SOCIOLOGICAL PREVISION* as principal question. The question thus set involves the whole problem of social science. In what measure is recurrence previsible?—recurrence not of facts (these do not repeat themselves), but of social situations analogous to preceding ones? Is it possible to determine more or less complex types of collective or individual life which repeat themselves under conditions capable of renewal? Is it possible to formulate laws,

analogous to those of other natural sciences, which are truly verifiable, in a near or distant future? Are these laws merely "tendential" and is their behaviour more or less a question of probability, of approximation? Is the aid of statistics necessary? Or may not statistics be only a mode of presenting facts from the past, without our being able to draw any indications from them as to the future? Is the calculation of sociological probabilities possible, given the relatively limited extent of the series observable and the instability of the more and more complex conditions under which social types have to reproduce themselves?

OTHER questions will certainly present themselves; we have so far submitted only a few from among them to the examination of sociologists, who will doubtless help in the elucidation of this serious problem by each giving his considered opinion. If, from now on, the authors of theories on this subject began to publish their opinions, should we not have in three years' time a harvest exceptionally rich in methodological ideas, such as would materially contribute to the advancement of the social sciences? And would this not be a first manifestation of the fruitfulness of the intellectual co-operation now to be organised?

FINALLY, we venture to ask all sociologists, justly impatient over the mere marking of time, the dispersion of effort, and the dearth of resources, to join us in attempting a reform of our habits and of our individualist anti-sociological procedure of investigation and thought.

ONE obstacle to an immediate collaboration of all sociologists can be foreseen; this is the general lack of a common scientific background. Mathematicians (as were Comte and Renouvier), self-taught students (like Proudhon), jurists (like Tarde), rarely economists (like Pareto), most often philosophers (as Espinas and Durkheim), men of learning without specialisation and lastly politicians—all have brought to sociological investigation an undoubted mental deformation which has persisted throughout the elaboration of "systems" or divergent theories. It is rarely that biologists, physicists, or any investigators trained in the school of true scientific study have deigned to benefit social sciences with their skill. Studying under the direction of Espinas and Durkheim as well as under eminent physiologists in the Faculty of Medicine, we have been able to obtain a close view of the drawbacks—which do not always compensate for the serious advantages—of a development of the critical spirit which results from an exclusively philosophic culture. If Durkheim had had the least aptitude for distinctively scientific research—biology or even physiological psychology—he would have been less of a dialectician, less of a Spinozist, Hegelian and Spencerian metaphysician, and the "sociologism" in which he has cloistered his "school" would have been incomparably more fertile, more open to legitimate influences.

WE consider it indispensable for the future of sociology that the investigators, observers and analysts of the collective life should be under the discipline, for a long period, not of philosophers or historians or economists or jurists, but of physicists and biologists, in order to pass through experimental psychology, and particularly psycho-pathology, which is closely linked with social pathology. We need, not schools of social philosophy in opposition to one another, but fully scientific colleges for sociological training. Our sociological societies ought to make appeal to mathematicians, physicists, biologists, and psychiatrists, rather than to statisticians, economists, historians and jurists, if effective collaboration under the ægis of the scientific

spirit is to be secured. Nothing has appeared to us more profitable than the work of the Genevan Sociological Society, 1929-1930, on social structures compared with physical structures, a naturalist investigation which has shown in an illuminating way how statistics are of value chiefly for a world of relatively simple and stable structures conceived from a mechanistic point of view.

WHILE awaiting the training up of future sociologists, it is expedient not to exaggerate the drawbacks of the present diversity of philosophical initiations. The tendency to deductive synthesis, to the systematic construction of a scaffolding of ideas, is not dangerous, provided it is early reconciled with the spirit of inductive analysis and of impartial and intelligent observation.

WE should lose yet more time in discussing "principles," if we desire to undertake nothing positive before having replied to all the objections of partisans or adversaries of any theory of knowledge or of nature. If we want to investigate what is the "fact" that will serve as criterion of the value of an hypothesis, we shall never make any empirical or experimental verification. There is a kind of scientific pragmatism, tacitly admitted for some time, and which becomes more and more clearly formulated, to which we are obliged to give our adherence, as to the "*argumentum baculinum*." It is a determinism that we presuppose without adopting any fatalist theory; it is sufficient for us to feel rightly or wrongly the need of admitting for practical purposes (the most ordinary as well as the most rational)—that there is an order approximately constant, to be discovered or to be established in the data provided by experience, as elaborated by our collective intelligence.

LET us then be practical: schools, doctrines, systems, divide us: let us ignore them. In biology, the bitter quarrels between vitalists, animists, organicists, partisans and adversaries of "finalism" could easily be revived: they are evaded by reducing to a minimum the share given to general theories in the majority of hypotheses and observations. This is indeed the condition of fruitful intellectual collaboration. We shall do the same in sociology, discarding that "negativism" of the dialecticians and pure critics which indeed has something of "*psychasthenic*" defect. Sociology will establish itself by "marching on" at the cost of many errors and attempts doomed to failure. If it is expedient to try all kinds of hypotheses, it is still more necessary to have secured the fullest opportunity for the appearance in full glory of eventual confirmation or invalidation. This is why international co-operation in sociology ought to be organised as speedily as possible.

COMMUNICATION.

TALENT AND GENIUS.

TALENT? Genius? What are these?—What do we mean by them?—What do we understand of them? How do they arise? Are they really so scarce as they seem? Or do we not fail in timely recognition, and in encouragement, as through education and opportunity?

If so, can we not more effectively increase, aid and develop them? What can we discern and apply towards such ends?—and learn from biologists, psychologists, and from eugenists? What have educationalists to say in this matter? And economists? And what of the various respective methods of diagnosis, and policies of encouragement? What have the sociologist and social psychologist, the moralist and the philosopher further to say of these matters? What can we learn from biographies of men and women of talent and genius, past and present? What of the general public, in its various occupational and social classes, its political parties and religious denominations? What, too, of their respective élites, among all of which there are so obviously men of talent, and sometimes of genius. And as these are so diversified, can we not learn something from each?

ENOUGH, however, of such questionings—though they are but a rough sample of the many enquiries which may come up before whoever thinks carefully of these matters.

AMONG these, how shall we begin, and most naturally, most simply? Surely in modern terms: so leaving aside the usually too vague, abstract or even supernatural explanations of the past, though all still lingering—can we do other than consider talent and genius as higher and yet fuller developments, arising in and from our species, and surpassing, in some one or more respects, the more familiar levels we observe around us, and in ourselves? Thus, in common-sense, leading on towards evolutionary science—and not forgetting possibilities of experimental furtherance—can we not begin a first sketch towards the treatment of these problems?

SCHOOLS, Colleges and Universities are still mainly conducted on three conventional assumptions: (a) of "the average" boy or girl, "the average" man or woman, being all we can mainly expect; (2) that "talent" is but rare, though no doubt to be encouraged; and (3) that "genius" is so exceptional as not to be expected nor needing to be specially provided for. It is sometimes said "it can take care of itself." Biologists and psychologists are, however, freeing themselves from this doctrine of "average"; since for them fallacious, and mythic, however sacred to statistician and bureaucrat. For they see that each and every human individual is unique; from features and figure to thumb-mark and signature, and so too from voice and expression to feeling-mood and thought-stream within. So this uniqueness cannot but indicate correspondingly distinctive possibilities capable of further development, however difficult to discern and to aid.

THUS, given the conditions of such healthy development, for mind and character, as well as for body, each latent individuality should realise itself; and this as normally as do seeds and buds to flower and fruit: so in mental health and powers, no less than in those of body. Each latent "talent" should thus find expression—why not to fulness—in the appropriate phase and stage of life. So why not oftener at least, that fullest flower or richest fruit, which needs no such supernatural name as "Genius"? For what is this, but the fullest unfolding of elements latent in ordinary humanity?—

else how could we at all appreciate it, had we not the kindred elements within ourselves? Here is a great poet's answer from experience: "Qu'est-ce que c'est qu'une grande vie?—C'est une pensée de la jeunesse, exécutée dans l'âge mur." Here, too, recall Newton's explanations of his discoveries—"I know not, save it be by always intending my mind thereunto."

LIKE all organic growth, genius arises and proceeds from within: yet this can be only too easily starved, repressed, stunted from without, even at times distorted or debased from within. Hence the educational and the social problem are alike comparable to the gardener's, with his careful tending of young life, and with each kind growing, in its own way, and to its best. Undoubtedly for humanity the problem is far more difficult; and this on both sides, individual and environmental. Parental and educational endeavours to provide favourable environment for youth are alike commonly too material and external: yet both family and community life at their best have often formed the essential habits of genius: its active thought—vivid, selective, and concentrated—with corresponding patience of realisation, day by day; despite not only material difficulties, but social also, though these—when beyond mastery as opportunities—so often yield too late. The highest function of the educator is thus as true critic, to discern young abilities, to encourage them to self-discipline; and to aid towards opportunity also. Thus our much visited and widely admired gardens here are neither a botanist's nor a florist's collection of rarities. They are of ordinary plants of use and beauty; yet these encouraged, by strenuous labour and skilful tending throughout their seasons, to their utmost exuberance of growth and flower. Hence fit setting, symbol, and even encouragement, for kindred endeavours upon the human level, however more difficult and slow to realise.

If the above bio-psychological interpretation of talent and genius be true—that of the fullest and maturest characters of each organic species as latent in its young individuals, and thus normally capable of development by them in their turn—(and who that knows anything of plant and animal development, or breeding, will gainsay this?)—it is thus not "talent" that is lacking in childhood, nor yet "genius" in adolescence: each is normal, as psychologists now clearly know, and boldly affirm: witness Stanley Hall in his *ADOLESCENCE*. So it is not in talent, or even in genius, that the wonder lies: both are to be expected—of course in varying individual measure—as latent in the young of our species. Hence, for the evolutionist, the real wonder is in their so frequent arrest, as blighted buds. Thus then he understands "the average man"—that highly artificial product of routine education, fallen to mis-instruction; so largely through his would-be educators, who have themselves so much gone through the same depressive influences, and often yet more fully; so how shall we re-educate our masters? Failures lie too in misapplication of talent, as by too many a "successful man"—and in perversion, as in so many a lunatic or criminal.

SUCH questions are for social science and its psychology to answer; they go beyond current psycho-analysis and eugenics, whether separately or together. It needs Social Analysis (one of the largest of all fields now opening for science), to explain how each phase of society—from savagery onwards, as anthropologists have shown—has so far, in its own way—and now so peculiarly ours in turn—been so widely arrestive of individual development. So again our psychologic poet:

"Il existe en effet, chez les trois quarts des hommes,
Un poète—mort jeune, à qui l'homme survit."

To seek further into the explanation of all this would thus far exceed the present limits. And yet more would the consideration of the conditions of Social Hygiene—of course in its widest meaning, of social revivance—psychic yet more than organic—which are so much needed towards normal development. So all this in association with the now opening phase of social evolution, which is manifesting itself even amid the present breakdown of our too crude Industrial Age. For this is still too largely Paleotechnic, albeit so far Neotechnic: yet even this needing to be incorporated into a more vital phase of society, more and more Biotechnic and Evolutionary. Our Industrial age has been guided—and overpowered—by its applications of the physical sciences to its mechanistic and pecuniary developments, thus so competitive and militant; so now this opening age of Revivance—still but in buds, yet these with many of the highest possibilities of our species—needs further guidance, and this from the sciences of Life in Evolution—biological, psychological, social and ethical.

ENOUGH, however, for the present to justify our renewing for each student—towards relieving his well-instilled inferiority complex—that call which St. Simon's servant every morning gave his master—"Levez-vous, Monsieur le Comte! Vous avez de grandes choses à faire!"

A FINAL word on Education, and towards Re-education. Progress has long been encouragingly manifest in preliminary and primary schools; and secondary schools have also been coming on in their turn during more recent years, though too many but slowly. Yet their best heads and teachers are wont to explain, and justly, that it is the lack of progress in Higher Education that delays them. How is this? Never have universities been more progressive, as regards advances of and in their departments of all manner of special studies, and so often of full equipment and high efficiency. Yet their Entrance Examinations are complained of by progressive teachers, as too much stereotyping their schools, and thus too much limiting—almost inhibiting—their best educational activities. This is felt in University circles, indeed often candidly admitted; yet the routine of their Examining Boards is not easily altered: and the curriculum of each Faculty, more or less obviously, stands in need of improvements, still too seldom introduced. Here then is one of the main conceptions of this Montpellier College undertaking, that of carrying out as many as may be of the needed advances in higher education; and thus demonstrating their practicability upon a larger scale elsewhere: since by showing how its students benefit by them; and this alike in studies and in subsequent careers. Past experience has indeed already proved this; not only here, but for many years past as in University Halls of Residence at Edinburgh and in Chelsea, and in many Vacation courses, &c., also. In all these some of our present endeavours were initiated, and found successful. Hence our present fuller developments aim at yet better results, and have now encouraging beginnings towards them.

TOWARDS the close of a long life of study and teaching in many universities in different countries, with visits to many more, and with the experience also of planning for some fourteen different universities in East and West, of course mostly in part, as for Halls of Residence, new Institutes, &c., yet also in some cases for new ones, each as a whole—the writer has made some progress with the largest and most ambitious of his books—now in progress for fully fifty years—on "Universities, Past, Present and Possible." Yet towards completing it, the last section—of possibilities—needs further experimental tests and justifications. Hence this choice of location, at the

University chosen as on the whole most suitable; and the past seven years of preparation of this College, and its incipient group of others, as "Cité Universitaire Internationale."

THESE preparations, with their growing Institutes, of biological, social and other studies (elsewhere outlined) are now sufficiently advanced to receive an increased number of students, both juniors and seniors, towards utilising the varied opportunities it can offer, and towards the aims indicated above—so particularly those of evoking and aiding the best powers of each individual. And these all the more through sharing in this endeavour, towards realising vital and progressive aims of higher education, and its social values, so far as may be year by year. Towards aiding in various ways in this, additional colleagues are also invited.

At our neighbouring Chateau d'Assas, used for historical and holiday visits, a new and progressive Franco-British School is being opened, and with peculiarly able and eminent direction, so that the needed correlation of progress between School and University education is also in its beginnings.

PATRICK GEDDES.

BOOK REVIEWS.

THE NEW SURVEY OF LONDON LIFE AND LABOUR: Vol. 1. Forty Years of Change. P. S. King & Son. 17s. 6d. 1930.

THE value of a social survey is by no means exhausted by its usefulness as a record and interpretation of the social life of a community at one point in time. One survey may become the datum line for comparisons in subsequent surveys and its date a new "anno domini" for sociologists. It is the sociologist of a hundred years hence, with a chain of social surveys built up after the pattern of an original survey, though extending in scope, and developing in treatment to meet the growing complexity of circumstance, who will be in a position to put the right value upon any one link in the chain.

RATHER more than forty years ago the late Charles Booth undertook his monumental inquiry into London life and labour, and after several years of work, completed a picture of the working class London of his time which was in many ways epoch-making. For the social reformer it was epoch-making because it revealed to the upper and middle classes of London, whose consciences were already being stirred by the more obvious privations of "the poor," the real nature and extent of that other London to which they were fundamentally strange. For the sociologist, on the other hand, it was epoch-making because it was a successful attempt to apply the scientific method to the study of a large community. No superficial results were aimed at, but an attempt was made:

"to show the numerical relation which poverty, misery and depravity bear to regular earnings and comparative comfort, and to describe the general conditions under which each class lives."

THE influence of this work has been enormous, extending far beyond the small circle of those who have worked through the seventeen published volumes of the survey, but in the future it will probably be valued less for its excellent static picture of the London of the 'nineties, than for the fact that it is the pattern and starting point for subsequent investigations, of which our contemporary NEW SURVEY OF LONDON LIFE AND LABOUR is the first.

THE New Survey, which is being carried out by the London School of Economics, is an attempt to repeat Booth's work after a lapse of forty years—drawing, of course, upon statistical data, and using some technical methods which were not available to Booth. When it has been completed it will make it possible to assess—at any rate, quantitatively—the social effects of the economic, technical and institutional developments of the last half century. It promises to be an extraordinarily valuable contribution to social science.

THE first volume of the NEW SURVEY is in the nature of a link—primarily historical and retrospective—designed "to bridge the long gap between the dates of the two inquiries by assembling and analysing such long-period data of a comparable kind as are available for the purpose of tracing the trend of economic and social conditions in London in the past forty years" (p. 5). It takes the form of a series of essays on various aspects of social life, in London, contributed by a group of distinguished authorities, and prefaced by an introductory summary and review by Sir H. Llewellyn Smith, which is of quite extraordinary interest.

THE formidable problem which faced the organisers of the NEW SURVEY of choosing a satisfactory geographical unit, is discussed by Professor Bowley

in a chapter on AREA AND POPULATION. Booth's survey was confined to the area of the County of London, but a survey based on such an area to-day would be very arbitrarily limited in scope; for whereas the population of the administrative County has increased but little since 1891, great developments have taken place in the outer ring of local government areas, the population of which has very greatly increased, and the bonds between which and the inner metropolitan area have been strengthened by the amazing growth in transport services. To have included the whole of Greater London would have been impracticable, therefore a compromise was adopted, whereby an area not quite half as much again as the County, with a population of nearly six millions (75 per cent. dwelling within the County area) was taken, with a few qualifications, as the geographical unit for survey purposes. The movement of resident population within this area since the time of the earlier survey has been centrifugal—small decreases being recorded in some central areas, very much more than offset, however, by large increases in the middle and outer rings. On the other hand a converse tendency has operated in the case of the "occupied" population which has increased in the central area with the growth of transport services bringing in every day thousands of middle and outer ring dwellers to work in the city. It is noted, however, that further out the population is becoming increasingly engaged in local industries independent, or nearly so, of London.

PROFESSOR Bowley, in this chapter, and in Chapter X., proceeds to analyse familiar Census and other data relating to the area of the survey, such as the density, sex and age distribution, and origin of the population, and the broad occupational and industrial changes which have taken place since 1891. In the latter case only the most tentative conclusions are advanced, and we are promised a fuller and more considered statement when the monographs on London industries, which are in the course of preparation, become available.

THE problem of measuring the changes which have taken place in the level of material prosperity is attacked by Sir H. Llewellyn Smith and Mr. L. C. Marsh in Chapters III. and IV., where a number of technical difficulties relating to the measurement of wage levels and the cost of living are faced, and are dealt with probably as satisfactorily as is possible in view of the limitations of the statistical materials. Once again the tentative character of the conclusions reached is stressed, and it is rightly pointed out that, in any case, the "average" rise in real earnings cannot be applied to the earnings of each individual worker, and that the "spread" of the figures is more important than their arithmetical mean. To give clear answers to questions concerning the facts of poverty is shown to be impossible until further data is made available as a result of the family investigations which are in progress. Nevertheless, these chapters do represent a valuable, and within recognised limits, highly successful attempt to discipline a body of intractable statistical material in order to indicate certain general tendencies in the movement of the level of material prosperity among the working classes of London.

In subsequent chapters, House Rents and Overcrowding, Travel and Mobility, Health, Education, Public Amenities, Unemployment, Poor Relief and Crime are dealt with by different authorities. Official reports and statistics form the basis of these chapters, some of which suffer from being cast (probably inevitably) in a too generalised form. Exact comparisons with conditions in the 'nineties are frequently shown to be impossible on account of the absence or defective form of earlier statistics, and many of the conclusions

arrived at are prefaced by cautionary qualifications. However, the writers have performed a very valuable service in collecting and arranging a great deal of scattered material, and in indicating some of the broad changes in social welfare of which this material is "prima facie" evidence.

JUDGED otherwise than as a preliminary survey, this volume is by no means entirely satisfactory. Its group authorship has resulted in a certain lack of unity which is not wholly remedied even by Sir H. Lewellyn Smith's admirable introductory review. It remains in the memory as a valuable and interesting collection of essays rather than as an organically conceived survey of a developing community. The pre-occupation of the writers with quantitative factors and indices sometimes lays them open to the charge, probably undeserved, of failing to recognise the more important qualitative considerations which lie behind even the most ingenious notation of measurement. Finally, the absence of any account of institutional development in relation to the social changes which are discussed appears to the present writer to be a serious limitation in a work which sets out to trace "the trend of social conditions in London during the last forty years." It is to be hoped that the extraordinary development of the work of statutory and voluntary bodies, and of institutional forms of social activity, which has taken place during the last forty years will receive the attention which is due to it in subsequent volumes of the *NEW SURVEY*. The publication of these volumes is anticipated with eagerness by a large number of sociologists and students, for whom the social problems of the metropolis provide an absorbing field of study. The interest and workmanlike qualities of Vol. I. augur well for what should be a worthy successor to Charles Booth's great work.

A. D. K. OWEN.

IN DEFENCE OF SENSUALITY : by John Cowper Powys. Gollancz. 1930.

HERE is a book of misleading and perplexing title—which on its cover Hugh Walpole tells us should be called "The Creed of a Modern Saint." The author defends his title, as enabling him to proceed "from rock bottom upwards as far as he likes"—in that development of fundamental Life-Sensation which is the subject of his book. He describes it as a philosophy, which

"attempts to emphasise what I regard as the sub-human and super-human elements in our cosmic awareness, and to reduce the claims of certain gregarious human ideals, which according to my view have muddled up and sometimes dried-up the primary wells of deep delight. It is, in short, an attempt to substitute a "purpose of life" better adapted to the real secret of the universe, for the one usually, though very vaguely, held by the majority of what are called 'civilised' people."

In brief, then, this book is of interest and even value to us as sociologists, by its very refusals of our usual methods and of many of our ideas, since it brings us clearly to the fact which we cannot wish to deny—that all our social studies and endeavours will be in vain, unless we aim at making the better society we desire, one of individuals with each personality realising Life, from its simplest and towards its highest.

OUR author starts then from his own "Loneliness—as first-born of Life" : so with his daily feast of impressions, his "will to enjoy," and thus apart from all customary questionings and sciences, theologies and philosophies,

with their prime desire to know. He concentrates on his direct and daily impressions of life, and his emotional reaction towards happiness; and this "capable of indefinite refinement and an indefinite ascent." He thus thrills deeply to the sub-human life of the animal and the vegetable: he is "like an ichthyosaurus on its primeval mud, isolated from all other identities"; and "meditating upon the ultimate feeling of being alive, and so as an animal, a vegetable, a reptile, a man—a lonely, isolated mind, confronting the universe."

Yet all this is selected experience, putting aside fear and suffering, and accepting only the urge of his own personality:

"it is not an ideal striving or a moral striving; it is the natural urge of all organic sap, like the thrust, both up and down, of a growing plant."

HENCE follows an interesting and suggestive outline of what has evidently been his own development; with criticisms of sciences, philosophies and religions, freely re-interpreted; and always preferring the growing life to intellectual explanations of it; and thus justifying art and poetry as more illuminating than science, since these are direct evocations and radiations of living vision. So with all this, a sense of the real life-problem—below and yet beyond discoveries and inventions—in the growing relations between the individual soul and the mystery of life. He thus leads us into his own moods of mysticism (and these in their own way often akin to its interpretation as offered in this REVIEW, January, 1930), and even towards an isolated form of saintship, enclosed within its hermitage; recalling that of Hindu Yogi and Moslem Sufi, in their lofty indifferentism to the everyday world of men and affairs, of popular doctrines and controversies, from which they set themselves so fully free.

THERE is no fear of us sociologists following such extreme examples: yet in life there is a time for everything; and periods of life-absorbing and life-enjoying, such as the author would fain concentrate his own life upon, and ours, too, will be found first restful, then helpful; and thence invigorating. And these alike of our observing tasks, our speculative thought, and our practical energies; and thus for clearing our pro-syntheses and strengthening our pro-synergies, in and for the betterment of social life. In all these, many of the greatest mystics have set the noblest examples, and initiated the most inspiring of influences. Hence—despite what are surely personal limitations at some points, and exaggerations at others—this very original and vital book well deserves in the main the cordial approval it has had from so many critics; and its already wide circulation is a yet fuller sign that in our so objectively individualistic and feverishly practical western world, there are many who can appreciate its insistent and helpful recall to the meditation of Life.

P. G.

THE AGE OF THE CHARTISTS: A STUDY OF DISCONTENT,
1832-1854: by J. L. and Barbara Hammond. Longmans. 1930.
(12s. 6d.)

THIS is the latest of the Hammonds' books and it adds still another link to the chain of evidence that they have assembled bearing upon that period of English history with which the student will always associate their names.

THE book is not a study of the Chartists, but, as its sub-title suggests, a diagnosis of the conditions which went to form the accumulation of discontent that found its expression in what is known as Chartism. The work

is adequately documented and indexed and its general scholarship is unquestionable, although like its predecessors it tends to state the problem from a particular angle. It traces the course of events which made necessary a Municipal Corporations Act and a new Poor Law; and these are used to demonstrate the ruling ideas of the time and to illustrate the character of the experiment in legislation that England undertook on behalf of her "new society."

In an interesting first chapter is put forward the argument that forms the whole core of the book, namely that the test of a stable and contented society may be made by asking the question "Have men and women a share in the life of the society to which they belong?"

In the Greco-Roman civilisation this share in life was found in the common enjoyment of the beauty of public things—in its cities, in its buildings, in its parks, museums, national festivals and public entertainments. This was made possible partly by the fact that there was a large degree of common ownership, partly by the fact that there was a strong tradition of private liberality and benefaction among the wealthier citizens of the time. Beauty for private gratification was unusual to the Greek and the power of the ancient world lay largely in its ability to stir the social imagination.

In distinct contrast with this was the tradition that grew up among the wealthy classes in the 18th century. By that time the obligations of society had come to mean something very different. Instead of the poor man being indebted to the rich for his luxuries he was indebted to the rich for his livelihood. The philosophy of the age justified this on the ground that there was a common opportunity for participation in the material wealth of the time. The opportunities were indeed great and a man by hard work and his own skill and judgment might become wealthy without a surrender of either conscience or freedom. But such prosperity was an individual success and brought with it the usual trail of evils that attend unfettered rights that are not balanced by common obligations.

GALSWORTHY in his play *THE SKIN GAME* makes the character of Hornblower remark, "God helps them who help themselves—that is at the bottom of all religion," and it was this same "self-help" philosophy that inspired industrial England in the 1830's.

In subsequent chapters are traced the conditions of social life in the "new towns." Their rapid creation and expansion left little time for ordered development and growth, while the traditional civic life of the "older" places had been lost or was swamped by the material requirements of industrial enterprise.

To touch upon but one aspect of the public services—Health. Thirteen years after the Municipal Reform Act of 1835 there were still 62 incorporated boroughs where there was no authority whatever with powers to supervise drainage, paving and cleansing. The Bridgewater Canal was of an interest to the people living in its vicinity not because of its engineering wonders but because of its use as a large and particularly offensive open sewer. Even in London it was reported in 1834 that the drainage of Kilburn, Paddington and Bayswater found a "suitable" outlet in the ornamental waters of the Serpentine.

In these early years there was little or no proper provision for the supply of drinking water; the erection of buildings was unrestricted, unregulated,

THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

and in the hands of speculators. Playgrounds and open spaces were unthought of; education was left to the voluntary societies and private individuals; and the Poor Law was inadequate insolvent and abused.

THE traditional balance of town and countryside had been upset in the general scramble for wealth. For it must not be forgotten that the new town populations were in the main country born people who had now become absorbed in a great mass of uneducated men and women who had lost contact with the natural things that had been the basis of their philosophy and religion. Formerly they had looked to the landlord and the parson for the amenities of life. They had now to look to themselves and to find their own salvation, often without possessing the necessary authority to do so. The "old" landlord was engrossed in a bitter struggle with the "new" and neither the Established nor the Free Churches came forward to meet the needs of the time. The Anglican Church debated the grounds of their spiritual unity with great heat while the Free churches narrowed their activities to a satisfying respectability.

THE government of the towns was eventually largely developed by men brought up under the Puritan revival, and under their code religion and business went excellently together. As a French writer has indicated, the non-conformity of the time tended to relate itself to the development of the English commercial family. On the other hand poverty and misfortune were synonymous with wickedness.

ACCORDING to the Hammonds the English Sunday was indeed a drab day with only the beer shop and the hell fire of the preachers' rhetoric to supply colour to the scene; but when one remembers the length of a working day in that age, with no half holidays and with practically all members of the family engaged in daily toil, one wonders whether the active forms of recreation more common to our own day would have been a physical possibility to many in that era.

THE Chartist Revolt was a revolt against a view of life, and it culminated in a general outburst of discontent among the masses in what may be termed the peak period of dissatisfaction in the 1830's.

AFTER that period a general civilising movement takes place. Efforts are made to establish local government on more effective lines; inquiries into social conditions are made and there is a noticeable increase of private benefactions and bequests to alleviate the suffering and distress among the poor.

THE experiment of stabilising society on the basis of gain was a failure. It had resulted in a mutilation of the body and soul of man a disfigurement of the countryside and a legacy of bitterness, distrust and disillusionment from which we are still suffering over a century later.

IN looking back one is amazed that the mass of the people have been as patient as they have, and that the physical degeneration of our town population has not been even greater. Probably no other country in Europe would have stood up to such conditions with such grim forbearance. It was the people of country stock of the 18th century who had to bear the brunt of these industrial evils. They made England the workshop of the 19th century; but the cost to human life and happiness has not yet been finally paid. It is well also to remember that the Hornblowers of this world are still cheered both on and off the stage, so strong is the instinct of self sufficiency, so easy is abuse.

A.M.L.

THE NEW EDUCATION IN THE GERMAN REPUBLIC: by Thomas Alexander and Beryl Parker. Williams and Norgate. (15s.)

THE American Authors are to be congratulated on this book. Their exposition of the educational situation in Germany is clear and comprehensive.

GERMAN education is directed against isolation. One soldier is a unit, told off from the others "by numbers." In the Prussian State every male was a soldier. He was educated, not to be responsive to his neighbours and the things around him, but to the word of command, the word of the State. Military training and education alike inculcated obedience and swagger and the result was the predominance of regimentation and rigid caste distinction at the expense of spontaneous human good feeling. It is from inculcation that educationalists in Germany have turned away.

EVEN before the war, there were in Germany voices raised up in affirmation of individual worth, demanding for men the opportunity of free development through adventure and self-discipline in place of the stereotyping of men in subordination to the pattern of the mass, ascertained by the State. It was a new humanism, worthy descendant of Meister Eckhart. The Wandervogel broke free from the limits of their narrow environment, impatiently loosed the pinions of custom that had hitherto held youth within the pale of a tame respectability, incapable of containing its eager aspirations and joyous activities. From a tradition that had become empty, they turned back to things traditional, the earth, the pine forest and the camp fire. Driven forth by their gusty spirits into the beauty and solitude of the countryside, by night as well as by day, they formulated to each other their visions, pondered the problem of living and brought forth, not a philosophy, but a way of life. "To shape our own lives with inner sincerity by our own decisions and on our own responsibility," "to stand together for this inner freedom, under all circumstances." These were their aims. Growth was in itself sufficient. "The renewal of man in body and spirit" needed no ulterior motive.

"THE Youth Movement appeared to lack an aim that would bring its forces into concerted action, but the leaders argued that this was a necessary and wholesome condition. They at least recognised a direction in their activities and that was the one given by the nature of youth itself. They had seen the misuse of teleological control and they were satisfied to let each stage of their development point the way to the next stage."

The traditional things upon which the Youth Movement drew, in its search for the renewal of man, was the lore of the German countryside and the myths of the Teuton race. These gave them a pride in their national heritage and bred a feeling of pride therein, capable of binding together a people in a unity which no State could equal in its endeavour to build an empire.

AFTER the war when the State had brought its philosophy to trial and been condemned in ordeal by battle, accepted systems were challenged and the German people looked for a new way of life. At this juncture, the Youth movement, which hitherto had stood aside from practical politics, feeding itself on its own ideals, found an outlet for its aspiration. The renewal of man had become a problem of the moment. In the pursuit of this aim education was a focus of endeavour. The older people whose characters had been formed under the Prussian State by "the rough shod inculcation of inculcated minds, case-hardened by their own thoughtless reiterations," for all that they very often were willing to admit new aspirations, new orientations, new methods, were not, by reason of their training, fitted to be leaders. A new generation must be born who, unaccustomed to the Prussian

overlords, should grow up free and clean and not suffer stereotyping according to a preconceived pattern. Education must be used as a sociological instrument for tilling the soil in which the new generation must grow. Many of those who experimented in adapting education to this new aim were inspired by the Youth Movement. In their efforts they went right back to fundamentals: indeed the deprivation consequent upon the war drove them to rely upon themselves and their own personalities for the skill and vision which should spin out the characters of the new free-born Germans. The very problems which faced them in running schools at all—problems of a struggle with nature for food and shelter—were embodied in the education afforded.

THEY have had to reduce the standard of living by supplying less heat and hot water, simpler food and service. The pupils and teachers themselves have taken over many tasks formerly performed by servants. Repairs and extension of buildings and equipment have often been the work of the schoolboy guilds. Necessity has come to the aid of a theory in education and given real purpose to labour that might have remained an empty form.

The inclusion of handicrafts in curricula was rather occasionally justified by necessity in this manner than generally dictated. With the movement which took classes and whole schools away from the town on a pilgrimage to the country, it was otherwise. German children after the war were undernourished. The material out of which the new Germany was to be built had already been tampered with. Physical regeneration of the young was a national problem. It was to re-establish physical health that teachers and classes found themselves roaming the countryside, training and hardening their bodies, eating simply but sufficiently of nutritious food. This and the development of "sport" was dictated by the deprivation consequent upon the war. But this way of life, at first directed to re-establishment of health, was found equally good for the healthy. Something new had been added to theories of education.

BUT this was not all. The teacher in the countryside learned the fallacy of the old conception which maintained that the classroom must be shut in and the windows obscured so that no stimuli might distract the attention of the children from their books. He found, on the contrary, that the wider the child's environment, the greater the opportunity of learning. All life and all knowledge is one and not only is the general shutting out of what had hitherto been considered distractive stimulation, restrictive, but also the division of knowledge into subjects, although a convenience to thought, is itself a cause of artificiality in learning and a limitation of enquiry. An event understood in its full context (*gestalt*) is appreciated and digested. The history of an event, abstracted from its context, classified and narrated to passive listeners, for all that it may be called a fact, remains information: the factor of appreciation is lacking and digestion depends upon appreciation. In their endeavour to keep the full context, German educators have encouraged their pupils to pay attention to a "centre of interest" instead of concentrating upon a subject. Experience and not classification provides the directions of thought.

IN its beginnings, the new education in Germany was a spontaneous growth, plastic and adaptable, seeking to promote the free and full growth of the youth to be educated. Certain men stand out as initiators and great educators; of these are Lichtwark and Jode. This education was local taking advantage of local variation: it was not stereotyped by the centre. It united new groups to promote education, in particular parents and school-teachers. Then with the progress of the republic, education again became

a system. "An open road for capacity" a variant of equality of opportunity, was the principle on which the system was reared. Men were to be grouped for neighbourliness not for isolation. The caste system was to be broken. The old prep. schools entirely, and the old private schools for the most part, were swept away. In the Grundschole, all children of all classes are assembled for a common elementary education, and sorting out is by capacity and not by social position as heretofore. Within these elementary schools the greatest effect of the new outlook appears. Not least in interest is the experimentation on the relation of the individual to the mass. In the schools the children work in groups. Group work is set up above the individual bent: so the Germans seek to educate citizens. Most diverse degrees of autonomy are allowed the groups. Will the result be the inculcation of a stereotype or free and proper association in accordance with common feeling. Time alone will answer.

THE new outlook on education which has influenced the elementary schools has not for the most part penetrated the secondary schools. Changes of course there are, but these do not reach to the basic principles of education. Secondary education still consists of learning a vast amount about certain subjects with one eye cocked on the examination syllabus of the university. Whether the improved elementary education will enable the pupil to digest this heavy diet remains to be seen. This also is the case with the question whether the stress laid on things intellectual in secondary education will give rise to new castes.

EVEN less influenced than the secondary schools by the new movement are the universities which still maintain the exacting standards of learning for which German knowledge is notorious, and these it imposes upon the secondary schools. Since all elementary school teachers must have been through secondary school and university, it remains uncertain whether they will eventually formalise the elementary teaching in accordance with their training, or whether the greater alertness encouraged by the elementary schools will permeate the secondary schools and universities and succeed in modifying their principles and curricula.

GERMANY disappointed in its attempts at Empire has awakened to the possibility of becoming a nation. Education is a means to this end. In education, Germany is seeking to get men and women to work together in order that, having learnt in common association the feel of their capacities and powers, they may take pride in carrying their responsibilities as units of a great nation.

K.E.B.

THE PURPOSE OF ADULT EDUCATION. The British Institute of Adult Education. 1931. (2s. 6d.)

THIS collection of the addresses given at the British Institute of Adult Education's meeting at Oxford in September, 1930, is of interest as foreshadowing a very much wider interpretation of the meaning of the term Adult Education than has hitherto been contemplated.

THE addresses should be read in conjunction with the Government publication *THE SCOPE AND PURPOSE OF ADULT EDUCATION* which is the result of an enquiry by the Adult Education Committee appointed by the Board of Education. This Committee has issued reports from time to time on matters concerning the Adult Education Movement.

TWO quite definite conclusions arise from these two publications. First, that there are large numbers of people who might benefit from, but are as

yet untouched by, any Adult Education organisation. Second, that there should be a greater catholicity and a wider differentiation in the planning of classes, if these potential students are to benefit from and give their continued support to the movement.

In the main Adult Classes have tended to follow the more academic lines of study, as was natural from the original conception of the University Extension scheme; but the number benefiting from this type of education, especially if it is conducted on an intensive basis, must necessarily be small, and with the growth and consolidation of the administrative side a very much larger field might well be covered.

THE danger lies in any misconception of the word "differentiation." If this is taken to mean a lowering of the standard of work already being done it would be a false move and one to be generally regretted. Some of the speakers at the Conference seemed to suggest this fear; but the provision of easy options is not contemplated. As the Board's pamphlet says "one of the greatest discoveries which adult education has revealed is that methods of systematic study may be extended and applied to the cultivation of interests of almost every kind.

GRANTED that the demand exists, it is surely better to face the facts and provide as liberal a choice as possible, with first-class facilities for all, than to start with the idea of an "all-in" policy in the hope that some of the misfits will eventually be attracted to "better things." The policy of "ground-baiting" at once lays its supporters open to the charge of the speaker who complained during this Conference that certain classes were being "surrounded with an atmosphere of lamentable pretentiousness."

THE majority of those at the Conference were evidently in favour of the bolder policy in the attainment of that objective "the education of the whole man," and we agree with them. Individuals must develop their own working philosophy of life along that line in which their interests lie deepest; for it is only by such means that a true atmosphere of social competence can be established.

THE British Institute of Adult Education are fully conscious of the need of exploring these new fields and of approaching the whole problem from fresh angles. They have taken a practical step to ensure this by choosing as their title for the subject under discussion at this year's Conference, "The mind and hand in Adult Education." Much useful information should be obtained at this meeting, which has a direct bearing on the new developments.

A.M.L.

ALCOHOL AND BEHAVIOUR: by Sydney Smith, M.D., M.R.C.P.,
D.P.H. Oliver & Boyd. 6d.

THIS monograph (one of the Henderson Trust lectures) surveys what is known of the effects of alcohol on man. These it shows vary between individuals; even the same individual is affected differently on different occasions and in different company. It has long been known that excess of alcohol brings about coma. The quantity of alcohol that constitutes excess for one individual may however have but little effect upon another.

THIS same variation of effect as between individuals is manifested in all the evidence brought forward. As the author says, it is not possible to draw any general deductions. On the one hand we know nothing accurate and general about the effects of moderate drinking, on the other we cannot

correlate the observable effects of alcohol upon the tissues of the body (as far as these are understood) with the resulting behaviour of the individual. The exposition is throughout clear. It reveals how little basis there is to many of the plausible arguments used both for and against drink.

K. E. B.

TYNESIDE PAPERS (Second Series).

1. The Trend of Population on Tyneside.
2. Changing Housing Conditions in the West End of Newcastle.

THESE papers are issued by the Tyneside Council of Social Service. The first series which appeared in 1926 contained information gained in the course of a local survey. The present series gives information as to current happenings.

THE essential importance of the subjects treated in each case reveals the keenest awareness of the problems of the neighbourhood. The clarity with which the present tendencies are made clear is exemplary. The first paper deals with the incidence of the falling birth-rate in Tyneside, and calls attention to a big movement of population from the district. It points out that these tendencies will with time show their influence on unemployment figures for the region.

THE second paper treats in the nicest detail the problem presented by the occupation by many families of large one-time "respectable" houses. It should be effective in influencing for the better the conditions in which the new tenants live. The occupation of large houses by a large number of families is taking place in many districts besides the area in Newcastle here described, for instance, Kennington. It is to be regretted that there are not in these districts bodies like the Tyneside Council of Social Service to reveal exactly what is going on, and to point out what steps could be taken to ease the transition and to ensure proper housing conditions to the new tenants.

K. E. B.

THE PRESTIGE VALUE OF PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT IN CHICAGO: by LEONARD D. WHITE. University of Chicago Press (Cambridge University Press), 1929. 11s. 6d. net.

MR. LEONARD WHITE is the Executive Secretary of the local Community Research Committee in the University of Chicago which publishes the series of Social Science Studies to which this belongs. His book on the Prestige Value of Public Employment in Chicago is an experimental study of the degree and kind of prestige attached to city employment in Chicago. He sets out to find the answer to the following questions—what types of people in a city like Chicago esteem city positions? What is the average ability of those who seek, and therefore secure, civic employment? He discovers that the lower esteem for city employment is found among the elderly, the well-to-do, the highly educated; among men rather than women; among the native born, and the executive proprietor and professional groups. By the examination of 4,600 cases, studied psychologically, Mr. White finds to some extent the reason why there are these degrees of prestige associated with positions in the working world. There are detailed tables of statistics showing, e.g., distribution of opinion of workers of various occupations as to preference for a city position or a private position, tables giving occupational prestige indices, and the qualities stressed as most necessary for civic workers. It emerges from Table XI. (page 35) that of those who expressed definite convictions, more than 3 times as many believed that private employees are more courteous than city employees; more than 4 times as many believed that private employees are more trustworthy than city employees; and more than 7 times as many believed that private employees work harder than city employees. The book is provided with a final chapter that gives a summary and conclusions.

THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

A COMMUNITY LABOR SURVEY: Bulletin 34 of the Bureau of Business Research, University of Illinois.

This bulletin sets forth a procedure, to be followed as a guide by communities in the conduct of a Survey, which may be briefly outlined thus:—

- (1) The formation of a General Committee which will plan the work to be done.
- (2) The selection of an active working Committee to direct the work of the Survey.
- (3) Arousing the interest and co-operation of the Community at large.
- (4) Surveying the possible sources of information and selecting those best suited to furnish the most reliable data.
- (5) Planning the questionnaires.
- (6) Organising a corps of canvassers.
- (7) Tabulating and analysing the data.
- (8) Writing up the Survey results.

The second half of the bulletin is devoted to illustrations, showing an actual "labor" survey conducted in Champaign-Urbana, Illinois, in 1929 and 1930, as a practical example of what such a survey may be expected to produce.

SLAVERY AND FORCED LABOUR IN LIBERIA: Report of the League of Nations Commission, 1931. Allen and Unwin. (5s.)

This Report runs to 130 pages, and deals with common or classic slavery in Liberia and oppressive conditions analogous to slavery; while part two is mainly concerned with forced or compulsory labour. This is followed by the findings, suggestions and recommendations of the Commission, and some 16 appendices quoting evidence taken on the spot.

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THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

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CHINESE ECONOMIC JOURNAL	April-July
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GARDEN CITIES AND TOWN PLANNING	April-August
GEOGRAPHY	June
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HIGHWAY	March-August
HINDUSTAN REVIEW	April
INDIA	December, 1930
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INTERNATIONAL LABOUR REVIEW	April-July
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JOURNAL OF ADULT EDUCATION	April
JOURNAL OF THE NATIONAL PLAYING FIELDS	April-July
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